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Introduction
Encounters
The first time I encountered the Mississippi, it was at The Fly, a riverfront
portion of Audubon Park on the western, uptown side of New Orleans. Its grassy
lawns, flanked with live oaks, end in a short concrete embankment along the water.
Below the embankment, there are various forms of erosion control – a step of wire
cages full of stones and schist, leafy stretches of batture forest. They're not the first
thing you see, though. You see the river looming broad and flat.
At this point (January 2014), I hadn't spent much time on waterfronts in the
city. When I saw water, it was sluiced through militaristic canals on the east side, or
flushed into storm drains in the Central Business District. Always it was channeled
and revetted through concrete passages or pooled up in grassy ditches, out of sight
and mind. All of the places I confronted water in New Orleans seemed to be highly
controlled situations, even City Park with its "wild" stretches of artificial bayou.
Initially this made sense to me – here we have a major city in the middle of the
largest deltaic complex in North America. This is a river known, above all else, for its
temperament and massive flood events – which formed the very sedimentary plain
that New Orleans was founded on. Of course water in the urban landscape will
always be somehow predicated by infrastructure, be cosmetic. Encountering water
in the city will always be a designed experience. The parks, the outfall canals, the
levees are recreational, but the way they are built tells us how engineers and
planners perceive the river – a hostile force.
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I remember thinking, while driving over NOLA's canals and drainage ditches,
of the dry, concrete bed of the Los Angeles River, winding through the city empty
and forlorn, an artifact of California's ongoing drought. I remember flying into
Phoenix over the Central Arizona Project, a 336-mile canal carrying water from the
Colorado River out to arid cities across the Sonoran Desert, most of it evaporating
along the way. These massive western projects support city ecologies that grow
increasingly difficult to water. They suffer from huge misconceptions about what it
means to "green" the urban landscape – enormous amounts of groundwater are
wasted on non-native grass species, almonds and swimming pools. These cities
highlight the ridiculousness of placing urban hubs in ecologies that fundamentally
reject development, which lack the basic local resources to sustain a large human
population. They agglomerate vast populations, economies, cultures: they can't be
moved.
This is the exact opposite of the problem New Orleans and its fellow cities
along the Gulf Coast currently face. In Louisiana, the high-stakes environmental
issue is the rising tide. The coast is slowly sinking into the Gulf, and it's a wellknown fact that almost half of the city of New Orleans has gradually subsided below
sea level. Some of it has to do with infrastructure. All of it has to do with the
Mississippi River, and the various attempts to control its notorious floods and
watery inundations, from first human contact with the land.
That Sunday at the Fly I remember thinking that the Mississippi, broad and
plain under a gray January sky, looked somehow naked. The river's width can create
the impression that the water is moving slowly. In fact, about 600,000 cubic feet of
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water move by the Fly each second. It's about a half a mile wide here. At Algier's
Point, the river measures 200 feet to the muddy bottom. Across the English Turn,
there is another revitalized waterfront called Crescent Park, the first section of
which opened in 2013. The purpose of such parks in the city – the Fly, the Crescent,
and Woldenberg Park (in the French Quarter) – are intended to foster recreation,
civil movement and health in the city. They also frame an encounter between the
citizen and the river. In almost every park, there is a stark border between the grass,
pathway, and the Mississippi's running water, seperated only by a thin concrete line.
A park in New Orleans is not the traditional sort of monolithic river control that this
project will mainly look at, but it serves as a good introduction. New Orleans' parks
offer a more everyday lens into designers' interactions with the river, and how that
design is influenced by their perceptions of the river's ecology. The park's design, in
turn, influences public experience of the river as bucolic, threatening, or some
hybrid territory. New Orleans' most-visited park is situated where all the tourists
go: the French Quarter.
Woldenberg Park is a strip of greenery and concrete walkway on top of a
concrete and earthen levee, with a rocky embankment leading down into the river.
There are a few monuments to immigrants, to soldiers, built in the 1980s, which
look like solidified WPA drawings. Sometimes there are music festivals in the plaza.
Woldenberg is an outlet for the drunk and sober, native and tourist overflow of the
French Quarter, to escape the grid and eat their beignets in the salt wind. However,
it is first and foremost a giant levee. The entire park is hemmed to the river shore by
the city's rail line (RTA), busy with street cars and large chemical train shipments,
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transporting commerce and tourists along the river's edge. Its border with the
Mississippi is a distinctively rough edge descending in a scramble of boulders.
Mostly, people run along the path, out of direct contact with the river. But there is
one prominent structure along its floodwall – a set of roughly hewn wooden
bleachers leading down to the water. The High Line in New York has a similar
feature, with wooden bleachers facing a glass window above 10th Avenue, framing
the every day traffic of bicycles, pedestrians and cars in Chelsea.
The metaphor is clear – it casts you as an audience member in a daily, urban
theater of economy and commute. In New Orleans, this theater is the Mississippi.
The expanse of brownish-green water extends in either direction, banked with
articulated concrete revetments cast in a row field in St. Francisville, LA. To the left,
the river is bisected by the Crescent City Connection, a cantilever bridge crossing
into Gretna, and the Governor Nichols Street Wharf, one of four major cargo holding
facilities in the city core. To the right, imitation steamboat barges, ocean liners and
Panamax container ships troll through the channel. That's what the river seems like
here – less of a river, more of a channel, a canal, a passageway for inner- and intercontinental trade. Brief ribbons of recreational greenspace extend along the river's
edge only in affluent neighborhoods – the French Quarter (Woldenberg), Carrollton
(the Fly), and most recently, the rapidly gentrifying Bywater district. The romance
of Mark Twain's Mississippi and the promise of adventure it holds seems largely
gone this far south – the river seems less landscape than infrastructure.
In Bywater, the first stretch of Crescent Park opened in 2014. It was designed
in response to a citywide competition called "Reinventing the Crescent," signed on
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in 2008 by then-mayor Ray Nagin (now sentenced to 10 years in federal prison for
bribery and money laundering, among other crimes in Katrina's aftermath). The
intent of this competition was ostensibly to get New Orleans' major architecture
firms to redesign the entire New Orleans waterfront as a single connected arc of
parkspace (thus, "crescent"). The plan is coming together piecemeal – the next
extension, from Mazant Street onward, is due to open in 2015. The first band of
park, from Elysian Fields to Mazant, has received largely positive popular response.
Doug McCash, writing for the Times-Picayune a few days after its February opening,
called it a "sevefire masterpiece," with its repurposed Piety Wharf displaying the
"untamed edge of the surging river [as] an open wound [...] with a certain welcome
edginess" (McCash). This language is iterated in many discussions of the Mississippi
– the vocabulary of riverfront encounters is one of precarity, possible danger.
To enter the park, you have to cross a giant pedestrian bridge made of
repurposed metal, which arcs over Bywater's concrete floodwall and an active
railroad line. It was designed by starchitect David Adjaye from Washington, D.C., in
collaboration with New Orleans' Eskew+Dumez+Ripple, and Hargreaves Associates
of Boston. It's true – as McCash suggests, once you enter the park, you are in
"untamed" territory. In this way the park operates on two levels, beyond
infrastructure and recreation – it's a bucolic expanse of gardens containing native
flowering plants and reeds, and a militaristic, harsh-angled wharf built over the
ruined pilings of a destroyed railroad. By leaving the edge of the river raw, unaltered
save the same kind of informal stone levee at Woldenberg, it reminds the parkgoer
of a difficult history of river control. Its progressiveness lies in the fact that it gives
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multiple identities to the same space. Most forms of river control in Louisiana, as
this project will address, are skeins over the complicated history of watery
inundations and various attempts to staunch them. Here, the pilings stand.

Fig. 1. Stepped levee design feature for the Crescent by Eskew+Dumez+Ripple (2008).

This tension between the history of the landscape and the infrastructure that
has subsumed it has become one of my central interests through research for this
project. It is almost always a problem of uncomfortable scaling – the infrastructure
rearticulates the land quite literally as it affects the distribution of sediment across
the delta. It simultaneously represents the levee, the revetment's local effect on any
particular riverfront, and also uniform attempts to do the same thing on almost
every inhabited waterfront community in southern Louisiana (i.e., every
community). Discussion of the levee system or the trophic effects of river diversions
require the kind of thinking in "deep time" that John McPhee discusses in Basin and
Range (1981). In this book, discussing geological scale, he proposes that "deep time"
is not a system of comprehension but measurement: "On the geologic time scale, a
human lifetime is reduced to a brevity that is too inhibiting to think about. The mind
blocks the information" (McPhee 127). Deep time is a kind of personal reconciliation
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with the fact that one's field of study, while scientific in nature and subject to
academic scrutiny of measurement and method, is almost entirely invisible, etched
into the surface of an earth millions of years ago.
The joy of Louisiana's geology lies in its youth. It's not so deep after all. The
sedimentary mat (alluvium) that southern Louisiana sits on is only about 7,000
years old. It is built off of the continental shelf by the Mississippi's outmoded LBM
(Land-Building Machine), which for thousands of years spewed sediment into a Gulf
stream much slower than its own current – so the sediment settled, accumulated
wetlands, and formed the deltaic plain. With the advent of digital imaging, LandSat
rasters available for public download from the USGS, GoogleMaps, etc. – this kind of
telescopic thinking has become more everyday. In the political map on your phone
or on the web, the southern border of Louisiana remains static. In actuality, those
young wetlands are rapidly receding into the Gulf. This is in part a result of the way
the river has been engineered via levees, spillways, diversions and countless other
forms of landscape technologies.
In these structures lies a central predicament: they both enable people to live
way out on the deltaic plain (New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and a constellation of
smaller towns depend on them), but they are also assisting its slow erosion. They
are both false friends and completely necessary. This project will teeter on that fact.
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Infrastructure and the Delta
In Italo Calvino's "Invisible Cities," a young Marco Polo describes episodes of
his travels to the emperor of the Mongol Empire, Kublai Khan, attempting to win his
favor. Urbanists love to cite various parts of this book to use as metaphors for
whatever city they're looking at. One of my favorite passages, under "Cities and the
Sky," describes a place called Thekla:
Those who arrive at Thekla can see little of the city, beyond the plank fences,
the sackcloth screens, the scaffoldings, the metal armatures, the wooden
catwalks hanging from ropes or supported by sawhorses, the ladders, the
trestles. If you ask "Why is Thekla's construction taking such a long time?"
the inhabitants continue hoisting sacks, lowering leaded strings, moving long
brushes up and down, as they answer, "So that its destruction cannot begin."
And if asked whether they fear that, once the scaffoldings are removed, the
city may begin to crumble and fall to pieces, they add hastily, in a whisper,
"Not only the city."
If, dissatisfied with the answers, someone puts his eye to a crack in a fence,
he sees cranes pulling up other cranes, scaffoldings that embrace other
scaffoldings, beams that prop up other beams. "What meaning does your
construction have?" he asks. "What is the aim of a city under construction
unless it is a city? Where is the plan you are following, the blueprint?"
"We will show it to you as soon as the working day is over; we cannot
interrupt our work now," they answer.
Work stops at sunset. Darkness falls over the building site. The sky is filled
with stars. "There is the blueprint," they say.
(Calvino 127)
Thekla is a city made entirely of infrastructure. It has no other components –
no houses, stores, or town hall, just framework and passageways, none seemingly
marked, all intuitive. Its unending construction is directed by a starry imperative to
expand and network. It's as if Thekla is the vast support system for another, internal
city which will never exist, no matter how deep into the scaffolding you go. It can
only exist in a state of constant construction because construction is the only work
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available to its inhabitants. Infrastructure is its culture, its reason for existence.
These workers operate under a divine order from the heavens (much like Manifest
Destiny) to add framework. The slowly shifting pattern of stars is not just their
blueprint, but their motivation, their employer and mentor, the only force driving
them on in their Sisyphean work – forever pushing a boulder up a hill only to watch
it roll back to the bottom. It reminds me, unequivocally, of New Orleans. If Thekla's
citizens stop building and updating their support system, it will fall apart – same
goes for the Army Corps of Engineers.
What would New Orleans be without its levees, without the networked
system of flood control along the river, stretching up to St. Louis? Now, virtually the
entire city is below sea level, which is an anthropogenic condition – the land outside
the natural levee of the river, denied its yearly inundation of sediment during spring
floods, slowly sank below grade. Further – what would New Orleans be without the
vast, networked river control system scattered along the Mississippi to the north, all
the way to Arkansas? Louisiana would return to its original growth state, before the
first French and Spanish colonies of the 1700s – a cypress-dominated marshland, an
ever-expanding estuary with freshwater currents, an alluvial plain steadily growing
to the size of the Nile's delta.
The Mississippi River delta is, as John McPhee described it, an "upside-down
superhimalaya," a natural phenomenon like no other in the Americas (McPhee 3).
Superhimalayas are the hilly roller coasters that rocket you along a small circuit, the
kind at county fairs. This is to say that the Mississippi isn't a static object of nature –
it's a river that shifts drastically over the landscape with the change in distribution
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of sediment and gravity. If the Mississippi River has many characters, operates as
many different kinds of protagonists, the Dynamo is one of these personalities – the
river as it existed before its concrete constraints and military mandates. The
Dynamo personality is a true agent of what William Cronon defines as "wilderness:"
a thickly social construction of nature, combining sublime beauty with the spiteful
hand of God, a "sacred" place with a "primitive" temper (Cronon 5). However, the
wilderness Cronon writes about are benign natural tracts that have become famous
in the American imagination – Hetch Hetchy, Yellowstone, the Adirondacks, etc. –
protected from the likes of John Muir and other conservationists in the late 1800s.
These were placed perceived as "temples," havens of the good spirit of nature. The
Mississippi's malignness, perhaps, is what opens it to thick development, to
surveillance and control at an unimaginable scale.
Wherever the river goes, it brings that uncertain encounter with it, that
capacity always to breach its shores and flood the land. All attempts to make
permanent settlement in the southern half of Louisiana, Acadiana, have been
contingent on the river's precarity. At the same time, it is impossible for there not to
be a major American city on this fringe territory – New Orleans is situated at the
mouth of the largest single American river. For this reason, Peirce Lewis has
described it as "the impossible but inevitable city" (Paleo 20). New Orleans is the
trade post that sees everything going in and out of mainland America, everything in
the boundaries of the Louisiana Purchase – all the way north to current-day South
Dakota, east and west as far as the watershed extends, encompassing more than half
the continent. The "birdfoot" mouth of the river, named so for its forking channels
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reaching out into the Gulf was originally a wide, shallow plain of sediment, thickly
shifting out into the slower saltwater territory. Now it is a deep, dredged channel,
trafficked by barges.
•••
This project wishes to examine past and present forms of river control in the
Mississippi delta, identify their macro-effects on the coastal ecology of Louisiana,
and their micro-effects on city planning in New Orleans. It's therefore a project
about uncomfortable shifts in scale – comparing the evolution of an entire coastal
ecology to the evolution of a street plan, the encounter framed by a park or a canal.
Such an analysis requires an extraordinary amount of backwork through history,
legislation, trade relations between early colonists, native inhabitants of the coast,
political refugees, slaves, wooden structures long flushed away by the river, and
environmental racism laid out across the land. It's a big topic, and I don't want to
attempt the form of an ethnography or historiography unsuccessfully.
Instead, I'd like to take a cue from Brian Larkin and focus on the "poetic
mode" of infrastructure – the everyday intersections of water, social processes and
technology, told in a fragmented narrative similar to actual lived experience (Larkin
335). Over the month of January 2015, I visited New Orleans and spent my days
traveling between various river control structures in the city and across southern
Louisiana. These include the Bonnet Carré Spillway, the Morganza Floodway, the
Old River Control complex, and various sites of levee crevasses, pumping station
failures, and watery inundations of all kinds, inside New Orleans and out. At these
sites, I interviewed biologists and engineers in the US Army Corps of Engineers
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(USACE), digital mapping experts in the USGS, and landscape architects dealing with
water in New Orleans – all members of a very large and diverse task force of
organizations charged with the maintenance of old infrastructure and the imagining
of a new system.
In the poetic mode, Larkin writes, "form is loosened from technical function.
Infrastructures are the means by which a state proffers these representations to its
citizens and asks them to take those representations as social facts" (335). In other
words, infrastructure is something people are taught to look past, to take advantage
of as a civic given – a dam as something to drive over, a sewer as something that
doesn't exist anywhere outside the imagination (until it malfunctions). Larkin also
notes that we often privilege the end effect of infrastructure – "we often see
computers not cables, light not electricity, taps and water but not pipes and sewers"
(329). When Le Corbusier wrote "Eyes That Do Not See," in Toward An Architecture
(1923) his elegy to ocean liners, airplanes and cars, he wished to create a more
plastic definition for architecture to include objects symbolic of the industrial age –
icons of globalization and mass production. In urban theory today, the word
infrastructure has come into its own vogue and experienced a similar widening of its
definition. Kazys Varnelis has argued that Le Corbusier's phrase – eyes that do not
see – is useful for infrastructure precisely because it's something made invisible,
built into the walls and under the streets. This project will be an attempt to look
with fresh eyes at the familiar, the banal structures of concrete and steel that have
reconstituted the landscape and urban imaginaries of southern Louisiana – the
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levees, revetments, spillways, blast-plugs, floodwalls, locks, chevrons, cutoffs,
dredge and drainage projects.
The word "infrastructure" itself can mean any number of things. In simple
terms, infrastructure is an "architecture of circulation," a series of physical
structures aiding the flow of goods, people or ideas, or more generally, "matter
enabling the movement of other matter" (329). Or restricting movement,
streamlining movement, editing movement, inhabiting any number of temporary
switch-and-bait roles depending on the river's flood level.
There's water infrastructure of the sort I'll be looking at in detail, but there's
also informational infrastructure evolving simultaneously. The French geographer
Elisée Reclus, boating into New Orleans for the first time in 1853, noted with
surprise that before they passed a single settlement on the coast, he noticed a
telephone wire extending into the distance. He remarked, with distaste, that in this
muddy wilderness, "science seems out of place [...] here, on soggy ground that is not
even part of the continent yet, but only the residue of waves, the telegraph is the
first work of humans" (Reclus 41). Far before the boom and boon of the coastal
fishing industry, an information-based economy was already vital to New Orleans'
existence as a trade post. This is infrastructure aiding the networked system of
merchants, monitoring the traffic of ships and foreign cargo entering and exiting the
river. In addition to being an unsightly reminder of the frontier economy, Reclus
also notes that the wires were largely inefficient, routinely knocked down by Cuban
cows brought there by immigrant farmers.
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Walter Benjamin called infrastructure the "collective fantasy of society" – an
architecture of desire, an enabling mechanism that allows the rest of society to
function smoothly, aided by an invisible support system (Larkin 328). According to
Benjamin, infrastructures, despite their apparent inertia, express communal desires
almost entirely separate from their concrete, technical functions. What desire is
expressed by a levee? The simple desire not to have one's home flooded, but
perhaps also a shared desire to best nature, as John McPhee has suggested in a
landmark 1987 essay "Atchafalaya." River control, he suggests, functions basically as
a military offense against nature, an Army Corps stronghold tasked with the defense
of everybody living in the Mississippi delta (or at least those within the levees).
How else might we define infrastructure? It is also a "mechanism to control
time," according to Graham and Marvin – in the case of the Mississippi, river control
wishes to keep the river perpetually flowing along the same course it travelled in
the 1800s, at the time of New Orleans' settlement (332). It is simultaneously a
military project, a project of controlling sight, a project of circulation dependent on
constant efficiency, a tool to measure a society's functionality. In Louisiana, it
attempts to make sense a messy ecology into a system where every last drop of
water and sediment are weighed and accounted for: an impossible but inevitable
task.
•••
Delta is not just a geological feature but a mathematical symbol signifying
change over time. It's represented by a triangle. This is useful
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– it turns a simple pronoun into an equation, a sentence with action. The Mississippi
River ∆. The Mississippi River changes over time. So do its people, their houses, their
streets, bridges and dams, agriculture and economy, in conversation with the river.
The delta is flat – it's not a landscape that can be stood above and looked out over, to
see whether a barrier island has disappeared that was there a year ago. The changes
in such a place can be drastic, but perception and evaluation of them is slow to the
draw.
The first section of this project will look at early accounts of the delta and its
various technologies from French and Spanish geographers, traders, travelers,
engineers, and the often-ignored population that maintained the levees until 1849:
West African and Native American slaves working on sugar and cotton plantations
along the river, Cajun, Creole and immigrant populations. It will track the history of
specific river-control projects and their different articulations as they switched from
private to public hands: from willow to concrete, from provisional to permanent
constructions.
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Chapter 1: Imaginations
Imaginations of the Mississippi
I was born and raised in Savannah, GA. As with New Orleans, visitors talk
wistfully of it as a sleepy southern town, existing somehow outside the political
functions of the rest of the country. People are supposed to be kinder, operating
under a code of hospitality symbolized by the pineapple – an exotic fruit endemic to
the Caribbean, adopted by European colonists as a false symbol of good intentions.
In wealthy neighborhoods, you see pineapples on doorsteps or embroidered into
curtains and upholstery. Above you are live oak trees bearded with Spanish moss,
whose hundred-year-old roots fracture and burst through the 21st-century asphalt.
These are the Southern Gothic images that sell on postcards, alongside images of
carriages bumping along the cobblestone roads of River Street – the cobblestones
didn't actually come from Savannah but from the northeast, ship ballast used as
cheap and convenient paving material.
One of the most prominent features of Savannah is its squares – a grid of
twenty-four green spaces inspired from the designs of old Turin and redevelopment
in London after the fire of 1666. Twenty-three squares, now that one's been cleared
to build a parking garage. They're bordered by one-way roads that create a
functional circulation of traffic without stoplights. James Oglethorpe (whose name
now lives on in a shopping mall out in the boonies) was the British general who
drafted the plan in 1733, about a hundred years after the first French settlement of
New Orleans.
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Both cities bear the visible character of military settlements – New Orleans'
original plan was a symmetrical sixty-six block grid bordered by the signature starshaped walls of French prisons and forts. This proto-grid is the current-day French
Quarter, elevated from floods on the natural levee of the Mississippi. Along the shore
grew batture forests, consisting mostly of black willows and cottonwoods, both
fluvial trees thriving off of constant inundation in water. Behind the natural levee,
the land mostly sloped off into slightly lower wetlands – porous land dominated by
bald cypress.
Growing up, Savannah and New Orleans seemed like sister cities to me,
sharing so much of the same visual culture, food and wetland species of grass and
amphibious fauna. My paternal grandmother, Irma Lee Pittman, came from Amite,
LA (just north of New Orleans), and drove back every December to deliver a
Christmas sermon in Cajun dialect at her childhood church. Her parents were killed
in the 1908 Dixie tornado outbreak that tore apart most of the town. One of the only
undamaged items in the otherwise torn-apart house was a Dutch girl quilt, which
Irma Lee later cut up and divided among her six children. A piece of it is framed in
our laundry room, the bonnet and apron stitched in faded pinks and greens. My
grandfather, Harry Rollings, received his medical training at Charity Hospital, the
oldest free teaching hospital in America. They married and moved to Savannah. In
2005, only a few years after each of their deaths, about half of the city of New
Orleans flooded after the I-walls on several outfall canals burst with storm surge
from Hurricane Katrina. Charity Hospital weathered severe flooding, with a small
team of German doctors taking care of the patients who weren't able to escape in
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time. Now the hospital is permanently closed despite its structural integrity, and
subject to a citywide debate about what to do with it – Mayor Mitch Landrieu
proposed renovating it as city hall, a team of activists behind the documentary "Big
Charity" continue to rally for its reopening as a public hospital. Plans for its
destruction as part of a neighborhood-wide clearance project to build a new LSU-VA
teaching hospital complex were shot down last year, leaving hundreds of people
without homes in a demolished historic district near mid-City. Amite, LA was torn
apart again this past December by another congregation of tornadoes ushered south
from the plains (Sanchez 1). More than a dozen families moved away from
Tangipahoa Parish. Goes to show – even in northern Louisiana, away from the brunt
of storm surge flooding and erosion, natural disasters still fluke the landscape,
displacing vulnerable communities.
The Dynamo characterization of the Mississippi is unpredictable: it redirects
over a hundred-mile radius at the tip of a hat, its current runs upstream for a night,
its oxbows bend so steeply that they cut off. The town of Delta is three miles below
Vicksburg one year, the next year it's two miles above (Twain 5). Picture a jar of
Mississippi water, freshly sluiced from a floodgate – a mythological substance. It's a
dense greenish-brown, filled with suspended matter that dances around in
Brownian motion – sediment settling into a gradient, gravel, small benthic
organisms in various stages of development, petrochemical runoff, decayed bits of
fish flesh, clay. It smells neutral, earthen – or somewhat like mildew if there's been
an chemically-triggered algae bloom nearby, increasingly common along the
American Ruhr. There's a tradition among riverdogs of tasting the sediment for
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good luck. Now it's avoided, a notoriously chemical sludge from Baton Rouge
southward.
This thick water comes from a river that is intensely alive, in the sense of Jane
Bennett's "vibrant matter." It's matter that, through its popular personifications,
takes on a role as actor in the human world – a substance with agency. Bennet notes
" ... that we are much better at admitting that humans infect nature than we are at
admitting that nonhumanity infects culture, for the latter entails the blasphemous
idea that nonhumans – trash, bacteria, stem cells, food, technologies, weather – are
actants more than objects" (Bennett 115). The Mississippi, too is perceived as a
nonhuman force driven over the vast gradient of mainland America by gravity alone.
Its drainage basin ranges from western New York state to Idaho, making it
responsible for the drainage of unimaginable quantities of water. It's a lawless entity
transcending political boundaries – a wall of reinforced concrete means as little to it
as the state line between Louisiana and Mississippi, which snakes along its path,
changing as it does. It moves over some of the flattest land in America, but never
lazily. At all times, it merely follows the path of least resistance to the Gulf with
shifts in the land, traveling in and among human constructions.
The characterizations go on: the river is personified as devilish, scheming,
intelligent, opportunistic, two-faced and deeply charismatic. It is also Twain's
bucolic river, representative of freedom and true, untamed wilderness. Geologically,
it's also relatively young – younger than the Rocky Mountains, and just about the
"youthfulest batch of country that lies around there anywhere" (Twain 5). Yet in the
time of its existence, it has switchbacked over nearly the entire states of Louisiana,

24
depositing sediment and forming vast new territories of wetland extending out into
the Gulf of Mexico. Here is how historian John Barry describes its current, in his
account of the 1927 flood:
The Mississippi never lies at rest. It roils. It follows no set course. Its waters
and currents are not uniform. Rather, it moves south in layers and whorls,
like an uncoiling rope made up of a multitude of discrete fibers, each one
following an independent and unpredictable path, each one separately and
together capable of snapping like a whip.
(Barry 38)
The Gulf Stream is a gentle lull in comparison. Most of the sediment that is not
carried out to Florida and up the eastern seaboard simply settles along the
Louisiana coast – it is a giant Land-Building Machine (LBM). It is an river that,
according to Twain, "is always changing its habit bodily – it is always moving bodily
sidewise" (Twain 5). It is a restless current with an almost corporeal presence.
Its currents will sometimes be intensely landscaped by river technologies,
and sometimes completely obliterate them. Because of its personality, it does this
not just as a function of physics, or pressure, but supposedly as an act of rebellion.
Take river cut-offs. Straightening the river was one of the Army Corps of Engineers'
major projects in the early 1900's, in order to reduce the amount of time and energy
it took barges to navigate the great looping turns of the river. Wherever the river
threw out oxbow bends, the USACE dug a channel between the two closest edges of
the river, cementing each edge with dikes to keep it from flooding during
construction. Often the dikes would be outfitted with "blast-plugs" to let the river
flow in and destroy the structure when the time was right – or, they would simply
be blown up with dynamite, letting the river divert its flow to the shorter path. 128
such cut-offs occurred between the years of 1930 and 1942 under the direction of
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Corps director James Buchanan Eads, shortening the river by almost 150 miles
(Barry). Studies conducted by the Corps had suggested this process would also
drastically reduce yearly floods, killing two birds with one stone. Its skeptics feared
that in doing so, meander cut-offs would also deepen the channel of the river,
denying the coastal region of Louisiana its yearly inundation of sediment.

Fig. 1: Manufactured river cut-off (USGS).

Meander cut-offs are a project that the river also naturally emulates through
time. Occasionally its oxbows, stretched to a ridiculous angle, will cut themselves off
through years of erosion and flooding, turning the parenthetical body of water into
an oxbow lake, which may gradually dry out without flooding.

Fig. 2: Oxbow cut-off (Radical Cartography).

Many river control practices do the same: edit the landscape by emulating
natural processes, but collapsing them in time. Constructed levees, on one hand, are
merely a reinforced mimicry of the river's natural levees. Revetments (which in the
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1930's consisted mostly of willow mattresses laid down on the river banks, now
made of articulated concrete links) are merely a reinforced riverbank, one that
doesn't allow for erosion or change. They are intended as permanent versions of the
geological forms the river has "naturally" created over hundreds of years – built,
primarily, to preserve the river's path as it existed in the early 1900's. In doing so,
these technologies preserved the communities that thrived off its commerce. Above
the entrance to the engineering school at the University of Wyoming, there is a
sandstone plaque etched with the words: "STRIVE ON – THE CONTROL OF NATURE
IS WON, NOT GIVEN." John McPhee noticed a version of this etched into the belt
buckle of a river engineer named LeRoy Dugas, or "Dugie," in 1989, an iteration of
the manifesto: "TO HELP CONTROL THE MISSISSIPPI" (McPhee 13). It might as
easily read, To preserve the Mississippi circa 1950, forever.
The river must move an incredible amount of water through a landscape that
has not been carved out for it by glaciers, and because of this exercises great
freedom in redirecting to whichever route is most geographically convenient at the
moment – and there are few barriers that keep it from throwing out oxbows to test
for a slightly steeper gradient. Or, with the gradual shift in distribution of sediment
across the state of Louisiana, it will simply begin diverting its waters into a tributary
until the original path of the river is a shadow of its former self. The entire southern
portion of Louisiana has been formed by these deviations.
Harold Fisk, a cartographer commissioned by the US Army Corps of
Engineers in 1944 to map the river's lineage, immortalized these overlapping, everchanging pathways. As far north as St. Louis, red, pink and green zones indicate
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formerly dominant routes – each weaves through others, billowing out like
variegated ribbons. Each ghosted riverbed fertilizes young forests with the alluvium
of a bygone era. The Cotton Kingdom of Louisiana and spine of sugar plantations
along the river thrived off this rich sediment – the agricultural economy of Louisiana
depended on it. John McPhee writes that "southern Louisiana exists in its present
form because the Mississippi River has jumped here and there within an arc about
two hundred miles wide, like a pianist playing with one hand – frequently and
radically changing course" (McPhee 5). Each previous course has been settled with
"arcuate strings of Cajun towns" – Bayou Teche, Bayou Lafourche. These are now
fishing communities along creeks and tributaries of the main river, now cemented in
place. In the 1940s, Fisk and a geographer named R.J. Russel identified six discrete
lobe-shaped deltas, each with their own sub-deltas dating back only about 7,200
years (Campanella 78). As a result, much of the land along the coast had only really
been land for a few hundred years at the time of New Orleans' settlement. The city
was built not on hard lithosphere, but on a "doormat" of alluvium that, without a
replenishing supply of sediment, would just as easily subside back into the Gulf. For
the first two hundred years of its existence, New Orleans was not defined as part of
Louisiana state proper, but appropriately, as a coastal island.
•••
In 1851, a young anarchist fled his native France after Louis Napoléon's coup
d'état. In the years after his escape, he served as a tutor across Europe and Central
America. He'd trained in geography, like many of his siblings, and came to be known
for this – his name was Elisée Reclus, now known as the father of social geography.
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All through his travels he kept fragmentary journals and letters describing the
ecology of various regions, and eventually arrived at the Mississippi River Delta in
1853, via the Caribbean. His accounts are remarkably attuned to the estuary's
ecology – he describes the delta as a "vast alluvia" composed of sands and clays from
all the mountain ranges of America, stratified along the Louisiana coast (Reclus 33).
All these sediments, this immense particulate migration, either filters "through the
sea continuously in a creative process that adds islands, peninsulas, and coastline to
the continent, or else, carried away by the Florida current, they are deposited a
thousand leagues away on the banks of Newfoundland" (33). As his little boat
navigated the "birdfoot delta" to drift upriver to New Orleans, his next teaching post,
he described running ashore constantly – all throughout the channel, small alluvial
islands had formed, to be washed away and reformed elsewhere the following day,
with the shifting current.
Basil Hall, an English visitor, described a similar experience entering the
river twenty-three years earlier:
"We coasted along, past numerous small, sandy islands," he wrote, "over
shallow banks of mud, and through several immense basins, such as Lake
Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain, half fresh, half salt, and filled with bars, spits,
keys and ... shoals [typical of areas] whose Deltas are silently pushing
themselves into the sea[,] raising the bottom to the surface." (Campanella 5)
The landscape Reclus and Hall describe is porous and flexible, a delta changing
drastically during storms, its soils shifting constantly. The same path is never
trustworthy twice. This is the silt-heavy landscape that earned the Mississippi its
nickname "the Big Muddy," because of the enormous pains that meant for dragging
equipment through its sludge. Reclus' discussions of social politics and ecology are
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surprisingly intertwined for a writing of this era. Most of the books I'll look at follow
in Reclus' tradition of a hybrid historical study, observing the communication
between the ecology of the landscape and the various structures that form around it
– whether as tools of social oppression in urban space, or technologies of the river,
with their own forms of restriction and release.
What follows is a survey of three major USACE structures (the Bonnet Carré
Spillway, Morganza Floodway and Old River Control) and other methods of river
control (levees, cutoffs and sediment diversions). Geographically speaking, it slowly
moves from southern Louisiana to the region just north of Baton Rouge. It also
moves generally from the earliest and most normalized forms of river control
(levees) to the most recent and contested (modern dredge technology and sediment
diversions). After looking at specific structures, I follow the delta to its very end, the
southernmost tip of Louisiana in Plaquemines Parish. Scaling up all along the coast, I
use Plaquemines to talk about land loss writ large around the Gulf coast, and the
problematics of mapping it. Then, I scale down to talk about the politics of water in
New Orleans. Like the USACE's mission to control the Mississippi, and subsequent
attempts to reverse the process through coastal restoration, this project attempts to
cover far too much in a limited amount of time with rapidly depleting resources. In
this concession, this freedom of movement across the deltaic plain, maybe it also
imitates a new style of river control – a semisolid, semifluid, swerving engagement
with the landscape.
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Chapter 2: Structures
I. Fixing the Riverbed: the Levee Debate
In his book on the origin of blues music in Louisiana, the ethnomusicologist Alan
Lomax writes:
Driving through the Delta, you hardly ever see the river, but the levee is always close
by, a great green serpent [...] the levee is unobtrusive, since its slope is green and
gradual, but in fact it is immense – higher and longer than the Great Wall of China,
very likely the biggest thing that man has ever made.

(Lomax 212)

The problem with levees, as Lomax would have it, is simply that they're part of a
system too large to imagine. They exist, on a person-to-slope basis, virtually
everywhere. If you are standing anywhere in southern Louisiana, chances are there
is one very nearby – an inclined, grassy serpent trailing the river. But the entire
system is unimaginably large, outlining the Mississippi and all of its tributaries,
branching out like lung pathways through its entire watershed across the interior of
North America. They're so common I often forgot they are anthropomorphic land
structures, built up out of the earth and maintained since the arrival of Louisiana's
earliest occupants. In this way, the modern levee system perfectly demonstrates the
problem of scaling with Mississippi River infrastructure – so common that it
becomes difficult to perceive its networked effect on attitudes toward the river, and
its ecological consequences.
Today, most levees around the New Orleans area double as recreational
parks – many have paved running and biking lanes on top. The Mississippi River
Trail, which stretches 3,000 miles from the river's headwaters at Lake Itasca,
Minnesota, all the way to Venice, Louisiana, runs directly through NOLA on top of a
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levee. Despite their apparent simplicity from the ground perspective, Lomax is right
– they're an enormous engineering feat, perhaps more important in their size and
effectiveness than any other river control feature. They predate every other style of
river control – earthen dikes built to prevent flooding or encourage irrigation have
been used since the earliest known agricultural projects in the Indus Valley, 2600
B.C.. "Levee" itself is actually a very broad term meaning "lifed" (note: past tense) in
French. It encompasses all imaginable styles of embankments using all imaginable
materials – piles or walls of sandbags, silt, clay, concrete, wood, tetrapods and
geotubes – anything to lift up the existing topography and keep water out. It also
refers to the natural levee of the Mississippi, formed of sediment deposits just
beyond the riverbank, just beyond the batture (riverbank forest, mostly willow and
cottonwood). Battures offer invaluable erosion control – its roots quite literally keep
the riverbank from being eaten away by every flood. When the batture is clear-cut,
concrete forms have to do the same work.
Before artificial levees, high spring water from northern snowpacks flooded
over the batture and the natural levee, supplying the backswamp with sediment and
nutrients that (for the rest of the year) inflated the soil. The drainage of
groundwater from this land causes a reverse process called subsidence – the land
literally deflates, falling below sea level and becoming even more prone when the
levee is breached. Shortly put – levees have the potential to worsen floods, making
them higher, more common and more violent.
The artificial levee is more than a grassy, oblong hill. It's a political border
that the Mississippi must obey, by mandate of the Army Corps of Engineers –
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without levees, the boundary between Mississippi and Louisiana would remain
static and meaningless while the river's curvature shifted across the alluvial plain,
and the Port of New Orleans shriveled into irrelevance. According to the USACE,
flooding only happens when the river deviates from its leveed boundaries – the fault
lies entirely in high spring water. Until the turn of the century, federal river policy
didn't reflect that the levees themselves might be partially to blame – actants in an
ecological feedback system creating gradually worsening floods. Unpopular theories
proposed that, unable to flood over the levee, snowpack waters merely rose ever
higher.
This past January, I drove out to River Ridge, LA (just a riverbend north of
New Orleans) to the site of an 1849 breach called Sauvé's Crevasse. Crevasse means,
according to a 1823 journalist, "the name given to a fissure or breaking of the levée
[...] almost uniformly produced by neglect" (Campanella 1). They most commonly
occur in four ways: overtopping (river rises above), underflow (river scours a hole
underneath), slumping (weight of water pushes a section through) and erosion
(waves cause the levee to slowly degrade). Crevasses in the 1800s were a fairly
common event, but were mostly small-scale – flooding agricultural land and not
much else. This is because levees in the New Orleans area were still maintained by
private, riverside landowners, who were almost entirely plantation owners. And
most of the plantations in Louisiana's cotton, sugar and indigo kingdoms, were
maintained by slaves of West African, Caribbean and (to a much smaller degree)
Native American descent. The construction of levees below the Mason-Dixon line is
actually one of the largest concealed labor projects in the U.S. – the Army Corps even
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notes in their informational database about levees that it's a common misconception
most American levees were built and maintained by the federal government. This is
untrue – only half the levees in Plaquemines Parish south of New Orleans, for
instant, are federally maintained. The rest are privately owned, mostly by
petrochemical corporations, who are then responsible for the implications for the
whole parish if their portion of the perimeter fails.
On May 3, 1849, the levee at Pierre Sauvé's sugarcane plantation was cut
through by underflow and eaten away to a 150 foot gape, letting spring water flow
freely into present-day Elmwood, Jefferson, Hollygrove neighborhoods, then into the
"bowl" of New Orleans city central, inundating nearly a fourth of the land that
flooded during Katrina. Most of this land in Jefferson County was agricultural or
undeveloped at the time, but when the floodwaters reached the city, it began
flooding homes at a depth of about six feet. As historian Richard Campanella tracked
in a 2014 Times-Picayune article, the flood only damaged about ten percent of the
land it flooded, but debilitated parts of the city's streetcar line. Steamboats
advertised tours of the breach in the local newspapers. A woman named Elizabeth
Lamoisse famously painted Canal Street under a few feet of water, devoid of cars.
Figures in covered canoes drift between Canal's characteristic median stand of pine
trees, shaded from the harsh Louisiana sun.
Despite the relatively small amount of inhabited property flooded, the
crevasse became New Orleans' rallying cry for the "Swampbuster Act" of 1850,
which involved the federal government in widespread drainage of wetlands along
the southernmost Mississippi. As Walter Johnson notes in The River of Dark Dreams,

34
during floods levees take on a double identity. Though they were built to keep water
out, once an overtopping occurs they do the exact opposite – keep it in. Quite simply,
he writes: "levees created swamps" though they were intended to prevent them
(Johnson 90). With the widespread agricultural clear-cutting occurring in the lower
Mississippi Valley, floods became less irrigable and more destructive. By preventing
drainage, levees held breach water in, creating anthropogenic swamps and forcing
the land's inhabitants to manually drain the water out – and with it, massive
amounts of sedimentary topsoil, putting almost half of New Orleans' inhabited land
below sea level, where formerly it was at or above. This, very briefly speaking, is the
beginning of how massive land subsidence began to occur during the early 1800s
(Campanella). The division that carried out these sophisticated drainage projects
eventually became the Mississippi River Commission in 1879, a federal entity under
the umbrella of the USACE. Around the time of its creation, Samuel Clemens (Mark
Twain) was drifting down from St. Louis as a novice steamboat pilot.

Fig. 3. The levee at Sauvé's Crevasse (personal photo).
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The levee at Sauvé's Crevasse meets today's height requirements of fifteen
feet above city grade, part of the USACE's 2011 "Project Flood" plan. The river-facing
side of the levee is armored with concrete revetment mattresses that protect the soil
from severe erosion. About twenty feet below the pavement, there is a thick, Tshaped concrete wall that prevents water from scouring the levee up from
underneath. At thousand feet punctuations, there are pumping stations which
gather rainwater from River Ridge neighborhood – from the highway and empty
drainage lots – and empty it back out into the Mississippi. Some are decrepit and
apparently out of order, like this one from the 1970s, compared to one from the
early 2000s:

Fig. 4. Pumping stations along the levee at Sauvé's Crevasse (personal photos).

Spraypaint on the asphault designates underground utilities, pipes flowing
through the trapezoid of earth. They exist primarily to pump rainwater out of
riverfront neighborhoods, where it settles at the lowest elevation, in massive pools
that extend across parks, ditches and bioswales after heavy thunderstorms.
Wherever outfall canals extend into the city – at 17th Street, Orleans and London
Avenue, the levees too fold in with them. These outfall canals are where the majority
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of storm surge water breached the Army Corps' levees during Katrina and flooded
nearly half the city, and did so precisely because the levees were there.

II. Sentry to the North: The Bonnet Carré Spillway (1930)
The town of Norco, LA is about 25 miles west of New Orleans, situated along
a stretch of the Mississippi known as the "German Coast" in St. Charles Parish. It's
called this because an influx of German immigrants were assigned this stretch of
property in 1721. The organization that owned the land was the Company of the
Indies, a French banking corporation which held monopoly over most of the land in
southern Louisiana until 1731. They left a small population of Germans there as
engagés to intermarry with Acadians and operate sugar plantations, supplying
surplus food for New Orleans. This area is also the site of the largest slave revolt in
American history. In 1811, Charles Deslondes, the son of a Haitian slave and white
plantation owner, led 200 slaves of West African and Carribbean descent from
Woodland Plantation toward New Orleans, only to be driven back to present-day
Norco by planter militia (Bacon-Blood). The heads of forty-five executed rebels were
displayed on poles on top of the levees at their owners' plantations (Misrach 28).
The place-names along this stretch of river – in corrupted German, French and
Spanish – are rich with history, violence, a land stripped of nutrients by centuries of
monocrop agriculture, adapted into oil refineries and nuclear facilities. The name
"Norco" is merely an acronym for the "New Orleans Refining Company." This
company was bought out by Shell and converted into their largest refinery in the
continental U.S.. It now employs most of the surrounding population. I don't mean to
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pass judgement by collapsing history – all of this is just a testament to the unseen
strata of sweat, blood, sugar and semen in this soil.
For our current purposes, here's the most important fact about this place: the
two miles of land just west of Norco occupy the shortest distance between the
Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain of anywhere in their neighboring bodies.
This geographic condition makes it the perfect location for a river diversion, a kind
of river control not attempted by the Army Corps of Engineers until "the last great
flood" of the Mississippi in 1927, best documented by John Barry in Rising Tide
(1998). This flood is widely accredited as the largest in American history,
inundating 27,000 square miles and displacing 700,000 people as far north as
Kentucky. Before this "call to arms" against the river's intensifying floods, the USACE
had a policy of merely heightening levees with the spring waters. Many engineers –
Charles Ellet included, as early as 1852 – argued that levees alone allowed
floodwater to scour the river bottom of sediment and rise higher yet, without its
normal capacity to drain over the natural levee into the surrounding wetlands. Much
better, he argued, to install a system of checkpoint diversions, allowing engineers to
tweak the river flow at various key points. During the 1927 flood, a levee just below
New Orleans at Caernavon was dynamited, allowing a much-needed outlet for
floodwaters and saving many city residents from further destruction. This
emergency diversion demonstrated the effectiveness of such allowances. Ellet's
vision became Project Design Flood, authorized by the Flood Control Act of 1928,
and the Bonnet Carré Spillway was its first major actor. Workers broke ground in
1929 and construction was completed in 1930.
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At the time, this was a revolutionary break from tradition for the Mississippi
River Commission (the branch of the USACE responsible for its entire drainage
basin, which encompasses most of mainland America). This policy shift represents
more than a simple change of engineering strategies – it also means accomodating
the river's deviance and opportunism rather than defying it, walling it off. As John
McPhee suggests, if we attempt to see such major floods from the river's point of
view (which of course is an exercise in futility), they're merely events of gravity and
grade. A surplus of spring water travels according to physical laws regardless of
political boundaries: no surprise. 1929 was the kind of event that occurred annually
(albeit to a smaller scale) before the settlement of New Orleans – it was how the
coastal wetlands received nutrients and sediment and were able to thrive. Thus,
Bonnet Carré also represents an acknowledgement that the river's ecosystem
extends beyond its banks. It enables the landscape to be a "porous place" with
shifting, watery boundaries, to take a term from Adam Mandelman. Its floodway is
one of the only places in southern Louisiana where the river's natural flood cycle is
still allowed to take place.
The Mississippi, characterized by New York Times headlines as "the
untameable river," "America's watery aorta," the lifeblood of the American
heartlands, which gives but is simultaneously "monstrous" and destructive,
becomes accomodated. This may seem like a common-sense policy change that
formed in reaction to a series of worsening floods, but thinking about it in entirely
military terms complicates the matter. If the Mississippi River Commission is a war
against Divine Providence, spillways represent a concession, a compromise –
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actually, an agreement on very uneven terms. Practically, they require the
displacement of rural communities and the rewilding of agricultural lands, allowing
the river to carry out its fundamental flood processes in a series of spigots.
Metaphorically, they are military strongholds which serve as outlets for the river's
periodical bursts of rage.
While two friends and I walked around the base of the structure to take
pictures, I had the distinct feeling of trespassing on federal property. When I heard a
voice shout down, "You need anything?" I was sure we'd screwed up. I couldn't have
been further from the truth. The voice belonged to Mindy, a woman working the
front desk of the Army Corps office, and she was seeing if we wanted to know
anything about the spillway before she went to lunch at the Norco Subway. We
ended up talking for half an hour about her eight-year-old daughter's obsession with
Frozen paraphenalia, including a full, blonde braided wig to complete her Elsa
costume (not for Halloween, just everyday apparel). Dr. Chris Brantley, a biologist
and overseer of the structure, was away that day – but the office shows an
educational video to school groups in his stead.
The Bonnet Carré Spillway is an example of a "frame" or "needle weir," a
popular style of river control built by French engineers in the early 1800s. A weir is
different from a dam – it's not intended to block the natural flow of water. It only
obstructs the flow slightly, so a pool of water forms at its top, while water courses
through it. Needle weirs consist of a line of short wooden slats (needles) arranged
along a larger structure – in the case of Bonnet Carré, there are 350 concrete bays
containing, in total, 7,000 needles. On the spillway side of the structure, there's a
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small retention basin and about a hundred meters of concrete pilings to prevent the
foundations from being scoured up by severe floodwaters. When annual spring
snowmelt comes down, runoff from the Mississippi easily seeps through the bays of
the structure into the floodway, converting it into a temporary wetland. Underneath
the structure, thousands of wooden pilings are driven into the soil. Like the pilings
supporting most of the historic French Quarter's foundations, they won't rot so long
as the water table remains steadily above them – no problem in such a wet place.

Fig. 5. BCS viewed from the floodway – retention basin and needles (personal photo).

Despite its monolithic, inert appearance, Bonnet Carré is a highly permeable
structure, a kind of tweakable membrane between the Mississippi and Lake
Pontchartrain. You can't see it in this photo, but on the other side of the structure
there is a low, grassy field stretching out about 600-800 feet to the riverbank. In the
flat, gray waters of the Mississippi, container ships line out to the horizon in both
directions. The names vary but are mostly Asian: SHANDONG, JIN ZHU HAI. On the
opposite bank, a cooling tower at the Louisiana Power and Light Waterford steam-
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electric generating plant spews fire into the sky, releasing pressure and heat from
its three nuclear facilities. If you stand there on the shore hummocked with
sediment, you can only think how incredibly removed this is from the Mississippi
immemorial of Mark Twain, a romantic river with an unpredictable temper. A river
has never looked so tame, so completely divorced from nature.
In 2013, parts of the HBO show "True Detective" were filmed here,
capitalizing on the dismal aesthetic of the infrastructure and clear-cut expanse. In
one scene, driving along a guide levee, Matthew McConaughey's character remarks,
"Pipeline's covering up this coast like a jigsaw. Place is going to be underwater in
thirty years." This knowledge seems to have become an accepted tenet of life
outside the city floodwalls: the rate of land loss is exponentially growing, and the
current system is unsustainable. Everyday life continues until there is another flood
or storm, and then the consequences are reaped.
Bonnet Carré's shoreline, according to Project Manager Chris Brantley, was
boat-dredged by the Army Corps until the late 1970's, to prevent a natural levee
from building up so high as to block the floodway's opening. Now, shore
maintenance is done with CAT hydraulic shovels and scoops. The earth is raw, fresh,
muddy, altered. Its location is no mistake – Bonnet Carré is situated on the accreding
bank of the Mississippi, its out-turn, so that sediment deposited on its shore
prevents the gradual erosion of the riverbank. The in-turn bank of the Louisiana
Power and Light plant is a solid concrete levee with dead grass along its crest.
What seem like small differences in water level to the American northerner
make an incredible difference in southern Louisiana, where inches measure the
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difference between "high water" and a flood or a breach. Water levels at the
floodway (and most river control sites in southern Louisiana) are monitored by the
USGS office in Baton Rouge, and data from the past year are publicly available on
their website. You can see the monthly trends – in January 2015, the gage height
peaked at around 9.2 feet on the 16th, and slowly decreased to its mean of 4.5 by the
end of the month (USGS). Chris explains – adding a caveat that he's no weather
specialist – that these monthly wet periods are caused by high pressure over the
south Pacific, pushed north by La Niña weather events off the coast of Chile. As flood
monitoring technologies advance almost exponentially, the USGS can predict high
pressure like clockwork before it arrives. Chris' most important job is to take these
data models and decide whether they deserve structural attention at Bonnet Carré.
If there's ever a sudden need to open up the spillway, he needs to be able to make it
happen at a moment's notice. The call actually comes from Major General Mike
Wehr, commander-in-chief of the Mississippi Valley Division of the USACE, who
mandates the exact amount of c.f.s. (cubic feet of water per second) to be diverted
through the structure. For larger structures like Old River Control, 135 miles north
in Vidalia, LA, this measurement is decided on by a full Congress – then passed
through Wehr.
On ground, it only takes three people to open the spillway – one for each
crane, and one to supervise. However, the USACE usually hires out eight speciallytrained staff members for each crane, with two supervisors each. The cranes
inchworm along the bays, individually removing the needles to allow water through.
He has supervised two openings thus far – 2008 and 2011 – and he says his main
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source of stress is actually the crowd of locals drawn to watch, up to several
thousand. It's a very public event, and people come from all over the area to see the
flood, a peculiar spectacle of narrowly averted disaster. He appoints a few staff
members to make sure enthusiastic fishermen don't try to launch their boats, or that
kids playing along the guide levees don't accidentally get sluiced off to Pontchartrain
in the riptide.
Despite these responsibilities, Chris is first and foremost a biologist, and is
well aware of the ecological impact that a spillway opening can have on Lake
Pontchartrain. Spring floods and occasional openings give the lake a sudden
injection of Mississippi water, temporarily reverting its brackish western waters
into freshwater. Saltwater organisms are pushed further out into the Gulf, except for
oysters, which are sessile. They can withstand up to about a week of freshwater, but
after that, massive oyster kills can occur. Blue crab and brown shrimp are driven
further out into unfamiliar fishing grounds, to be replaced by blue catfish and
largemouth bass. The fishing community is often vocally against openings for this
reason. Algae blooms in Pontchartrain can also occur if phytoplankton populations
get out of control. There's a whole range of trophic effects these currents can bring.
The Army Corps dependably paints a positive picture – ideally, when the lakewater
contains beween two and twenty parts per thousand salinity, the majority of
freshwater and saltwater organisms can flourish simultaneously. Phytoplankton
(supplied by freshwater) are eaten by zooplankton, which feed shrimp populations
(supplied by saltwater). Salinity is a delicate balance along the western border of
the lake, so measuring the amount of water that's diverted through the spillway can
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make all the difference between a much-needed boost in biodiversity and an
ecological wreck.
Chris says these gray areas – zones of intermediate brackish water in coastal
wetlands – are greatly diminishing with land loss. He's all for diversion tactics that
will reintroduce freshwater to areas of the coast no longer receiving it – after
centuries of straightjacketing the river's high water with levees. I remember the
Land-Building delta of Basil Hall, with the plain of basins, "half fresh, half salt," and
the incredible range of phytoplankton and all the euryhaline species that can
navigate brackish water – gars, eels, bullheads, bluegills, pickerel, catfish, carp. And,
of course, shrimp.
The Bonnet Carré Spillway demonstrates a kind of openness rare to other
Army Corps sites in southern Louisiana. It's a highly recreational area. There's easy
visitor parking. There are no signs to warn off trespassers – in most respects, this is
a public park. The Army Corps office is right off the road, instead of set back behind
a barbed wire fence (like every other site I visited), and I didn't need to set up an
appointment, I just walked in. Perhaps this is because of its proximity to New
Orleans, the fact that it's much more likely to receive tourists interested in the
spillway, or birders – and hunters, lots of them, who patrol the bordering forests.
There's a a number of artificial ponds with names suggesting their community of
visitors who have a legacy on the spillway – Wesley, Amy, Holley, Tyrone, Bob,
Fhylway, Mr. Ed, Clark, Wacko. Much of the clay salvaged from them go to rebuild
nearby levees. During spring floods, they fill with fish and freshwater crustaceans –
that was Chris' childhood introduction to the spillway, coming here to net crawfish
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with his dad. There's a section devoted entirely to the local RC model airplane club,
and a small stretch on the western end for dog training. When I was there, a man
fired clay pigeons from the back of his pickup, shot them, and his dog fetched the
remains. From a bird's eye view, you can see a huge webwork of ATV tracks: this is
also a racegrounds.
Bonnet Carré's openness may have to do with how the land was bought out.
The Morganza Floodway, for instance, isn't under the federal government's eminent
domain – its basin is patchworked with private property, extending from north of
Baton Rouge all the way through the Atchafalaya Basin and into the Gulf. The two
properties that existed on Bonnet Carré before its construction, the "Diamond" or
earlier "Roseland" and "Hermitage" (both sugar plantations) were requesitioned by
the USACE in 1928. Diamond (owned by the Kenner family) wasn't being used, but
Hermitage was an active farm owned by the Kugler family. Much later, in the 1980s,
it came to public attention that there are cemeteries on both properties dating back
to their earliest settlement. These graveyards, unmarked on early maps of the
property, each contain about 150 bodies of unidentified slaves of West African and
Caribbean descent. During the 1975 opening of the spillway, remains of one body
came to the surface and were taken by the St. Charles Coroner and Sheriff, who
thought it was the body of a dumped murder victim. In 2008, the site was finally
scoured and excavated by archaeologists – families of the descendants were
contacted about what how the USACE should landscape the site, and in 2012 a
meeting was finally held on the topic, led by Chris Brantley. A Kugler family
descendant was present, as well as Leon Waters, a local historian and griot,
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descendant of enslaved rebels involved in the 1811 march to New Orleans. Kugler
requested that, on the historical plaque to be installed, a large version of his family
insignia would be printed. Waters responds with a long discussion of language to be
used on the sign – never "residents" because it obscures the slaves' role as captives,
never "African American" instead of "African" or "of African descent" – and that the
Kugler name not be printed, because it's no longer Kugler property (USACE 7).
This whole debate brings to light an effect that USACE projects sometimes
have on large historic properties in southern Louisiana – that of dehistoricizing the
landscape. After the spillway becomes public land pockmarked with recreational
ponds, the story is occluded of the people who once inhabited it. A similar thing
happens with levees in the area. People often forget that the levee system of the
Lower Mississippi Valley, until about 1849, was built and maintained by slave labor
on private plantations.
All this said, Bonnet Carré is far and away the structure with the most
advertising available online and in print pamphlets issued by the USACE – there's
even a hokey YouTube video called "the Spillway Story" buttressed by positive
tokens of Louisiana culture – gumbo, jazz and scenic bayou shots. All of these convey
the same message – the spillway is the poster child for success among a slew of
highly contestable and constantly failing public works projects. Its technology, as a
needle weir, is very simple and old-fashioned. It also represents the kind of flexible
technology pushed by coastal restoration advocates, a deus ex machina escape duct
that time and again saves New Orleans at the last minute. But this is sentimentality.
Let's not forget that Bonnet Carré is only one cell in a very complex network of river
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engineering, from its oldest and most banal forms (levees and dredge) to most
recent and "innovative" (digitally self-aware sediment distribution pods, for
instance). And, further, that this system comprises the infrastructure that has
enabled everyday life to exist in Louisiana for the past five hundred years, with
periods of intermittent wetness – a scale shift to be reckoned with.
This is the kind of "scaling-up" that I find myself constantly having to do
when I visit flood control systems – like in Google Earth, viewing the floodway,
when I quickly toggle out and the entire surrounding land slowly pixellates into
resolution. It's too easy to see the Mississippi's characteristic switchbacking line
across southern Louisiana as a static line.

III. Rewilding the Delta: The Morganza Floodway
The presence of water nearly always complicates land ownership. River,
lakes, estuaries, wetlands – all present fluid borders that contradict traditional
American notions of property. A central case in point for this very simple thesis is
the Morganza Floodway. Notice the slight word difference – Bonnet Carré is a
spillway, but the Morganza floods. Its appearance is very similar to Bonnet Carré to
the untrained eye, but it's fundamentally a gate, not a membrane. Instead of wooden
needles, it's lined with thick steel doors. While the B.C.S. is a mile and a half long,
Morganza is five, with a twenty-mile floodway. While the B.C.S. has been opened ten
times for a total of 415 days, the Morganza has been opened only twice – in 1973
and 2011. This is because, while its floodway only extends twenty miles, the water it
diverts into the Lower Atchafalaya Basin drains all the way down to Morgan City
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and out into the Gulf of Mexico. After twenty four hours, the water floods down to
the area west of Baton Rouge. After forty eight, just north of Morgan City. Three days
in, it floods out into the Gulf of Mexico south of Houma and into the surrounding
coastal estuaries: geographically, its waters bell out through the entirety of southern
Louisiana.
The central concern with Morganza is almost the same as with the Bonnet
Carré, but the stakes are much higher. If the structure somehow fails, the Mississippi
River will do what it has been attempting to do for almost a hundred years, and
redirect down the shorter, steeper gradient to the Gulf: the Atchafalaya. It is situated
about twenty-five miles south of the Old River Control Structure (ORCS), and directs
its floodwaters into the same basin – only on an extremely temporary basis. In the
way that Bonnet Carré serves as an auxiliary structure to the city of New Orleans,
Morganza sits as a monolithic supplement to ORCS.
It is not, however, recreational. It is private land under a federal easement. Its
plans were proposed in 1928 in the wake of the Great Flood (at the same time as
Bonnet Carré), but construction began much later, in 1937. It was completed in
1954. In the intervening years, a much vaster environmental engineering effort
occurred than the structure itself. Its construction required that everything in a
twenty-mile width south of it, snaking all the way to the Gulf of Mexico, 100 square
miles in total, had to be converted to wilderness. Cheramie and Pasquier, in their
essay on the relocation of Zion Traveler church during Morganza's construction,
liken this to William Cronon's construction of "the American tendency to idealize
'nature,' to separate 'us' from 'it' in order to preserve an Edenic ideal" (Cheramie 3).
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In southern Louisiana, wherever you are, this nature-culture divide almost always
falls along the guide levee, and nowhere is it clearer than along the borders of
Morganza.
The floodway will always be a zone of instability because it is a region that
has been repurposed by a military agency to return to a completely natural state
whenever federally ordained. At these moments, like Bonnet Carré, it allows the
river to complete its flood cycle unhindered – but only within the guide levees. To
live between the levees of the Morganza, even though you are protected directly
from the portion of the Mississippi nearest you, is always hazardous. That zone
operates under two identities: the first is your life-as-usual, whether you're working
at a gas station outside Morgan City or shrimping the bayou. The second is an area
that, with a single signature, can go underwater in less than 24 hours.
As with other massive public works projects of a similar ilk – close to Bard,
for instance, the Ashokan Reservoir – a massive displacement effort occured,
spearheaded by the USACE with a billion-dollar budget. "Non-essential structures
and spaces," mostly agricultural, were kept in the spillway, but most other
structures were relocated just to the other side of the levee – the cemetery shared
between Zion Traveler Baptist and Mount Olive churches (one of three) was bought
for thirty dollars (Cheramie 5). Without disinterring the bodies, the USACE merely
built an identical mock cemetery with empty graves on the dry side of the levee,
after rolling the church over on logs. The graves remain empty today, and their
bodies unaccounted for in the floodplain, which is now farming land. A large
population of African-American farmers were displaced by this move, forced to
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either disperse or form new communities several miles away – many of those who
stayed still attend service at places like Zion Traveler. This is evocative of something
discussed earlier with Bonnet Carré – the peculiar dehistoricizing effect of
floodways on the purchased land. The USACE, in building a grid of placebo graves,
manages to convince the community around it that they are able to keep their
history, just move it 0.3 miles away, but what's lost during this shift? Not only
physical bodies, but the rootedness in a particular land replaced by something so
similar, so near, that it's almost unnoticeable. It presents the community, if they
accept the relocation, with a new version of their own history, like a copied disc, its
quality slightly degraded from the original. To somebody driving by, Zion Traveler
looks as if it has always been there just to the right of that guide levee – and for the
USACE's purposes, it has.

Fig. 6. NASA and USACE photos of the Floodway in May 2011 (Wikipedia Commons, USACE).

A question that Morganza raises (by implication) is, what happens to land
when the reverse process happens – when land is unflooded? Who do the property
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rights go to, and under what conditions does it become federal land? This is a
question at the heart of the present-day movement for Louisiana coastal restoration,
a project that (as of December 31st, 2014) received $13,427,713,465 in reparations
for the 2010 Deepwater Horizon spill.1 Their public report, online, is available in
English, Spanish and Vietnamese. So, say somebody with gulfside property has their
land flooded and home destroyed during Katrina. Simple: the land becomes state
property. Richard Campanella, a geographer at Tulane, discussed this in an
interview with me: "But what happens when water reverts to land on account of
coastal restoration? The titleholders of a lot of these properties have to be contacted
and involved in the fate of that footprint. Tracking them down and dealing with all
those titles is very complicated." The population has been disenfranchised either
because of flooding, public works projects or some massive combination of the two
– and they're brought back to a reconnoitered land by the same token. But the land
has been dehistoricized by the USACE, flooded or farmed – it may be
unrecognizable, its soil quality may be completely different, rich with sediment or
starved of nutrients in saline water.
The longer land sits underwater, the more it becomes a "non-place," no
longer a grid unit in a USGS map, but a territory of water particles obeying only the
laws of nature. It's not even a watery realm with the consistency of an ocean or lake
– it can exist in multiple states of inundation or wetness, decided entirely by the
For reference, $11,621,821,251 of that is going to individuals and businesses for
medical expenses and property damage. $1,472,994,209 is going to local
governments in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas (for seafood
testing, tourism and "behavioral health") with a smaller federal allocation. It's
unclear how much of these compound funds will go toward projects like the Coastal
Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA).
1
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amount of water in c.f.s. that the Army Corps allows through floodgates a hundred
miles to the north. Here you see the disconnect, the shift in geographic scale.
Every year, the USACE sends out letters to residents of the West Atchafalaya
(and Atchafalaya Basin) Floodway to remind them that they may be forced to
evacuate if there is a need to divert water – regardless, life goes on largely as usual.
When those large-scale floods actually do occur (as in 2011), there is an enormous
public uproar. As Campanella mimed, "they pick up their phones, call their
congressmen and say, 'This is an outrage! The government failed New Orleans when
the levees gave in – and can you believe it, they're flooding my land!' " The residents
of the Morganza structure's exit path to the Gulf, as well as those inhabiting
floodways to the north (the Madrid and the Missouri) are all living under flood
easements. They own the land, but the federal government has the right to flood it
when necessary.
Campanella argued instead for the establishment of development easements –
which mean that the federal government, while still not owning the land of the
floodway, still hold the right to flood it. The landowners receive additional
compensation for not building any more structures on the land. The reasons are
simple: people living in a floodplain, even when notified in advance, are always a
liability. If you look at any satellite picture of Louisiana from the past twenty years,
you will notice that a strip of land from north of Baton Rouge all the way to the
Atchafalaya delta is green and seemingly empty. Between the guide levees there are
173,000 acres of cypress swamp and 64,000 of aquatic land, both seasonal wetlands
and bayous. It is not, however, empty.
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IV. Atchafalaya Revisited: Old River Control (1963)
Driving north along I-10 to Baton Rouge is a prime lesson in the ecology of
southern Louisiana. Once you exit the last band of levees and outfall canals lining
city limits, the highway feels like a thin ribbon of concrete laid out over several
hundred miles of swamp. The transition is almost instant. One minute, you're
driving through the outskirts of Metairie – the next, you're in no-man's land, the
nether-regions of Louisiana known to NOLA simply as "the bayou." It's an endless
expanse of heavily forested swampland. In January, the trees are bare and black. The
most striking plant is the bald cypress with its buttressed root system adaptable to
both wet and dry situations – this is the characteristic bayou tree bearded with
Spanish moss, by which most people unconsciously identify the Louisiana coast, in
its southern Gothic tradition. From the air, you can see radiating lines cut into the
swamp – bald cypresses harvested in "hub and spoke" patterns by early loggers of
the flooded areas surrounding New Orleans (The Anxiety of Influence, Mandelman).
There are other canals dredged without such apparent patterns, a straight,
networked system of thruways without an apparent destination. These are usually
oil and gas canals dredged for underwater pipelines, which slowly erode away at the
surrounding wetlands without yearly floods and supply of sediment. After looking at
maps of southern Louisiana for several months, this becomes an unconscious eye
exercise: water that appears in straight lines is anthropogenic, water that wanders
and sallies (like in the 1945 Fisk maps) is most likely "natural."
The biggest mistake is to assume this land is uninhabited. It is – and thickly.
Fifteen-foot plastic skiffs motor around the base of the highway looking for shallow-
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water fish. There are fishing shacks all around, with corrugated metal siding and
roofs, moored up to the highway pilings. It looks this way about three-fourths of the
way to Baton Rouge, about one hundred miles in total. Only then – and the transition
is very stark, once again – you reach the continental shelf of the United States.
Swampland turns into great stretches of agrarian land, and I-10 is once again
sheathed in the endless stretch of pine trees that seem to line every major southern
thruway. Like everywhere close to the Mississippi, the towers and cooling eggs of
the American Ruhr are never far.
For geological purposes, everything south of Baton Rouge is a web of young,
coastal islands linked by a thin mat of wetlands – essentially, a thin alluvial mat
extending out into the Gulf, no longer supplied the yearly boost of land-forming
sediment that formed them. Without this consistency – and especially without
frequent floods since the early 1900s – the Mississippi River is no longer the "LandBuilding Machine" (LBM) of yore. Sadly, this fact is old news. Much more recent are
the monolithic river control structures further north that keep the old system
pinned in place, preserving the Mississippi River circa 1963 ad infinitum. Old River
Control is the prize jewel of this system – and it's situated well out of the public eye,
at the turn of the Louisiana boot's border with Misssissippi.
In comparison to the Old River Control Structure (ORCS), Bonnet Carré can
look somewhat cosmetic. The singular here is confusing – ORCS is actually a
network comprised of a hydroelectric dam, two "sill structures" (essentially, river
weirs, but much sturdier than Bonnet Carré), another dam and a boat lock dredged
to eleven feet below sea level. Geographically and temporally this is confusing – all

55
structures, as usual, were completed at different points in time corresponding to
different needs. What makes ORCS so special, other than its expansiveness, is the
fact that it's one of the better-known river control sites in Louisiana other than
Bonnet Carré – and not for recreational reasons. In February 1987, John McPhee
published a piece in the New Yorker called "Atchafalaya" about the importance of
ORCS in preventing the Mississippi from redirecting entirely down the more
convenient pathway – namely, the Atchafalaya River. Two years later, the essay was
republished in a collection called The Control of Nature – in both publications, the
essay was widely read and garnered the Army Corps of Engineers an unwarranted
amount of attention. It thoroughly illuminated the futility of the task at hand, and
the militaristic language used to describe it. Always, the Army Corps describes a
"war" against the river, which must remain straightjacketed within levees for the
safety of the surrounding population.
Old River Control is well off the beaten path. Driving there, my GPS directed
me along a levee-side road that traverses some of the poorest land in Louisiana. As
of 2013, almost thirty percent of Concordia Parish lived under the poverty line (ten
percent below state average), about sixty percent white and thirty percent black (US
Census). For about another hour past Baton Rouge, I sped past tarpapered
structures set up on concrete blocks and motor homes strewn with tinsel and
Christmas decorations. According to the census, the majority of the local population
works in retail and "office jobs," with only about ten percent farming. Not being a
social statistician by any means, I wonder what significance a structure like ORCS
has on the local economy. In terms of its landscape presence, it's easy to miss. The
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lower sill structure, Sidney Murray Hydroelectric Station, and auxiliary (or
"closure") structure all double as roadways – all except the last are fairly
inconspicuous. But the auxiliary structure is a series of seven enormous concrete
bays connected by walkways and stairwells, whose purpose still somewhat eluded
me during my site visit. It's situated much higher above grade to provide additional
release should it ever need to release flood waters back through the Mississippi.
From the structure extend two curved conrete walls to prevent shore erosion in the
unlikely event that the mammoth structure actually be dug up like a levee. Given the
sheer size of the structure, the fact that such an event is possible stumps me. The
shores on the southern side of the structure were parched, dry to the point of
cracking. Because of this, you can tell it's composed mostly of clay – the lower outlet
of Old River hasn't received smaller sedimentary particles since 1963.
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Fig. 7. Lower Auxiliary Structure at Old River (personal photo), ORCS via USACE Flickr and GoogleEarth.

Despite the Auxiliary Structure's impressiveness, the main component of the
ORCS network is the sill structure a few thousand feet to the north. This is where
McPhee's attention is directed in the 1987 essay. It has ten bays with metal gates
that restrict the water input into the Atchafalaya River, like the Bonnet Carré or
Morganza. There is little difference in structural design, really – except for the fact
that the ORCS sill mediates the flow of an active waterway. Not only that, it's not just
battling the Mississippi's floodwaters. It's battling the gravity of the entire
Mississippi river (floods included) – which tells it without a doubt to redirect down
the Atchafalaya, the easier path to the Gulf. I say this with some drama, but all of it
warranted: the fate and livelihood of all Louisiana residents living below the ORCS
depends entirely on its functionality, every day of the year.
For this reason, the ORCS network represents a profoundly different war
than the floodways that preceded it. From the standpoint of flood policy alone, it
would be enormously convenient for the Mississippi to redirect down the
Atchafalaya. In this scenario, the former path of the Mississippi would gradually
become a bayou a third of the original channel's size, not subject to occasionally
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violent spring waters. But with the floods, everything else would dwindle – the
river's utility as a major trade route into the heartlands of the U.S., encompassing
over 39 states with their major cities. The petrochemical industries thriving off of
this accessibility would likewise fall, their massive plants rendered useless. The port
and city of New Orleans would eventually be bankrupted, and its industries would
shift to more convenient locations like Morgan City, Houma or Lafayette. This is the
worst-case scenario. From a land conservation standpoint, it would also be
complicated – the birdfoot delta, no longer receiving its yearly load of sediment,
would fade away (like it's already doing), but the Atchafalaya delta would flourish. A
new deltaic lobe would begin formation, and the LBM would be, Army Corps
notwithstanding, back in business – fifty miles west of New Orleans.
The banks of the river here are heavily manufactured, lined with concrete
revetments and supported by stone jetties like those built along Lake Pontchartrain.
More than any other river control site, ORCS made the Mississippi look like an
industrial channel carved into the land, a thruway for massive trade boats.
Geographically, its evolution is somewhat complicated. Around the time Abraham
Lincoln came down the river on a flatboat in 1828, the junction between the
Mississippi and the Atchafalaya (via the Red River) was completely blocked by a
natural logjam. Thousands of fell trees that had fallen into the river from erosion
and flooding gradually built up in a pile at the rivers' confluence and were cemented
together with sediment, effectively acting as a weir that only allowed in a fourth of
the actual current. In 1831, Captain Henry Shreve of the Union Army dug a channel
through Turnbull's Bend, the oxbow that joined the two rivers. This channel filled
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with water – except for a thin earthen wall that contained explosives. When it was
dynamited, the Mississippi quickly redirected down the faster route, reopening the
entrance to the Atchafalaya. Such minor alterations – a small channel dug a few
hundred feet between two river bends – demonstrate the complete opportunism
that the river became known for in that time. At its size and velocity, it will take any
open route that offers the path of least resistance to lower ground, and eventually
the Gulf. At the present moment, it has been mandated against the better route.
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Chapter 3: Scaling Up
Venice, Louisiana
Travel (something the ethnologist mistrusts to the point of hatred)
constructs a fictional relationship between gaze and landscape.
Marc Augé, "Non-Places" (86).
During my month in Louisiana, I followed a simple itinerary. In the morning, I
drove out of New Orleans (Marigny neighborhood) to various river control sites
throughout southern Louisiana. I talked to USACE officials, geographers, landscape
architects, or whomever I ran into while crawling over concrete structures and
taking pictures. In the afternoon, I went to libraries, wrote and read. At night, I ate as
much crawfish étouffée as possible. In no way does this constitute ethnography.
Maybe it more resembles the travelogue genre, in which the intrepid writer
researches a place, arrives with a list of preconceptions, and piece by piece attempts
to verify each one. Or Twain's model, where the intrepid writer arrives with no
ideas and no plans – just a rucksack – ready to be filled with firsthand impressions
of the landscape and "genuine," local interactions. I say this tongue-in-cheek, with
some amount of distrust. If I'm concerned with categories, maybe I would classify
this month simply as a time to satisfy my obsessions, and ask people on the ground:
how exactly is life sustainable here? What kind of system can be designed – so late –
to repair a complex of river control technologies that have literally become the
ecology of the region, the one governing factor controlling where water is allowed
and where it's not?
Admittedly, I read a fair amount of ethnography and I find it very useful to
read river infrastructure through an anthropological lens – one which networks the
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system of actors, human and nonhuman, that plume out from these structures all
through the Mississippi River delta, literally flooding the banks. I won't pretend to
take the same approach. I had too many moments of outright failure, incomplete
trips, or intuitive drives out to obscure locations to identify my experience as
ethnographic. My conversations were exactly that – conversations, not interviews.
My excursions felt more like scouting for a larger, unrealizable project, one that
could examine on a closer scale all the displacement, unrest and coastal instability
caused by Louisiana's infrastructure. For instance, one Saturday after breakfast, a
friend and I decided to get in the car and drive as far south as possible.
•••
It's not difficult to get to the southernmost tip of Louisiana. The directions
are basic: from New Orleans, cross the Crescent City Connection, make a right-hand
turn onto Louisiana 23-S, and drive to the end of civilization. In whole, it takes about
two hours. You may feel the surrounding landscape collapsing into a horizontal blur
of infrastructure, petrochemical industry and housing units – never allow yourself
the luxury of ignoring the blur. Plaquemines Parish, which you enter almost
immediately upon exiting the floodgates of New Orleans, is a place in which most
central questions of river control are posed at their most extreme. I mean
"floodgates" very literally – at the southern city limit, there is a point where a levee
meets the highway. On either side of the road, long metal gates flank the length of
the road, which can be closed during high water events, effectively sealing the flood
out – but also the entire population of Plaquemines. 23 is their only artery to the
north. Admittedly, the gates aren't obtrusive and are easy to miss as you drive by,
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but they send a very clear message – if you live south of this line, God help you when
the next storm comes.
Infrastructure, however, continues. South of Chalmette, the earthen levees
along 23 were under extensive construction when I drove down in January 2015.
Small clusters of cranes and CAT crawlers distributed and packed mounds of soil
into a compact trapezoidal shape, reinforced with buried concrete T-walls to
prevent erosion. This work is done by the Coastal Protection and Restoration
Authority (CPRA), a division of the USACE established soon after Katrina to mitigate
wetland loss. As soon as you exit the floodgates, citrus groves begin. They're
everywhere – planted in cemeteries, backlots and trailer parks, alone in a stretch of
swampland or a hundred meters from an enormous processing plant, separated
only by a chain-link fence and a hundred meters of soil. Little orange stands litter
the roadside. A pile of children's bicycles accumulate in a front yard.
There are quonset huts, sallow fields, men riding tractors down the center of
the highway, endless trailers set up on concrete blocks – maybe temporary homes
provided by FEMA that were never upgraded, or whose occupants moved out. There
are always smokestacks in the distance. By these towers, you can always measure
your distance from the Mississippi – plants and facilities for Monsanto, Halliburton,
Chevron, OMI, TARGA, and endless other big names in petrochem trace the river's
every switchback. This has earned the stretch of river between New Orleans and
Baton Rouge various unflattering nicknames – Cancer Alley is the one Kate Orff and
Richard Misrach use in their book "Petrochemical America," which traces the history
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and impact that chemical breaches, displacement, and oil buyouts have had on
surrounding communities' health and living quality.
Another transition is also clear: human settlement spreads ever thinner the
further south you go, and when it does appear, it appears on increasingly higher
pilings. Even the cross in front of a Presbyterian church is elevated on a small
platform – and I think, "come Hell or high water." I imagine this clause must figure
literally or figuratively in many of the land contracts and leases in Plaquemines
Parish – who would make such an investment, other than oil workers and
fishermen? On 23-S you pass two enormous public schools, both of them raised a
full two floors on massive columns, with double staircases leading to the entrance.
They look, unsurprisingly, like fortresses with their hexagonal wings and tightlysealed windows, echoing the militaristic lingo of the USACE. I wonder, what level of
flooding legitimizes a day off? Is it something they deal with yearly, or entirely
provisional, only becoming necessary when hurricanes breach the surrounding
levee? I would have asked somebody, but on a hot January Saturday, both schools
were empty.
The further south you go, the more harbors and shrimp boats there are. The
raised nets of shrimp trawlers are the only other prominent vertical element in the
landscape besides cranes. You can tell there is a large Vietnamese population here
by the names carefully painted on the back of each boat – Thuy Trang, the Lady
Hana. The width of the land on either the side of the highway is barely half a mile in
total. In every direction the Gulf yawns out, docile and flat. This is the region that
appears on colonial maps from the 1800s as the "birdfoot delta" – a projection of
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three waterways from the central path of the Mississippi, a region that we can
remember was described by Basil Hall and Elisée Reclus as a thickly shifting field of
sediment and soil hummocks, coastal barrier islands that were never the same day
to day. Now it's open water, with an increasingly vulnerable community at its
border.
During a lecture for his geography class at Tulane, Richard Campanella
reminded us that the birdfoot delta is the only area of southern Louisiana where the
Mississippi River still functions in its pre-colonial land-building mission.
Unfortunately, so much sediment has been trapped in various wetlands and
diversions before it reaches Venice that even this last frontier has become impotent.
Venice itself – the last township at the end of 23-S – isn't so much a municipality as
it is a small network of marinas and anonymous, gray-brick, fenced-off facilities for
Chevron, Halliburton and OMI Environmental Solutions (a company offering oil spill
and hazmat response). This is also the site of the Delta National Wildlife Refuge, a
swatch of wetlands of about 49,000 acres extending out through Terrebonne Parish.
It encompasses almost all of the previous deltaic lobes of the Mississippi – from the
Atchafalaya through Bayou Sauvage, Bayou Teche, Bogue Chitton, etc. The office and
center of this coastal empire is situated at the branching off of Grand Pass Bayou
from the Mississippi called "The Jump," and I have to admit it was a little
disappointing. It consists of a tiny information booth, a patch of grass, and a bench
facing the marsh. At the booth, there are single-fold hunting information pamphlets
– in order to become a certified hunter, all you have to do is sign the bottom of one
and bring it with you on your outrigger as you speed along.
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My friend Ginny and I sat there for a while watching fishermen motor by in
shoddy boats, talking about the odd feelings this place gave us. First, there was a
profound feeling that we were trespassing, stopping by various petrochem plants to
take pictures of dirt mounds flocked with pelicans. At the same time, there was a
feeling of lawlessness – that you could pull off the highway and fish wherever you
wanted, put your boat in, hunt unperturbed. What exactly does federal oversight
look like in such a complex web of oil canals? Venice is a peculiar mix of the
corporate, of unimaginably large entities with their high-security plants, and local
fishing culture, Cajuns at the very end of land. On online employment boards for the
Venice-Boothville area, most open positions are at the TARGA plant, offshore
platforms, and the local Dollar General. The population is 212. A Vietnam veteran
who lives down the street from me in Savannah comes here for a few months each
summer to work on BP oil rigs, and lives off that salary for the rest of the year – it
makes me wonder how long each of those 212 citizens have been here. Before
Katrina? Here on short-term contracts, just a summer and then gone?
For such a prominent place in the Louisiana imagination, Venice is
surprisingly data-poor. Beyond 2005 images of fishing boats and houses stranded in
the middle of the highway, there is not much information available about the
birdfoot region online. There is, however, a huge community of birders who travel
regularly down here to see coastal birds in unbelievably large numbers. As we drove
along the last stretch of highway, twenty or so pelicans drifted over the water
alongside us, finally flaring their wings to land, feet out. A husband-wife couple
crouched on the shoulder of the road, watching through enormous binoculars.
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23-S, at its very end, meets Tide Water Road, which takes you out to what is
technically the southernmost tip of Louisiana. It ends in the parking lot to a Chevron
refinery, with a small unpaved trail leading out into the reeds. There is a sign: "The
Gateway to the Gulf."

Fig. 8. The southernmost tip of Louisiana (personal photo).

About eight miles below this point, the Head of Passes directs all traffic in
and out of the main channel of the Mississippi. From 1852 to 1872, there was a
small lighthouse situated at the center of the "birdfoot" operated by the U.S. Coast
Guard. In 1854, its 67-foot tower was moved to Pass à l'Outre, and the Coast Guard
lit a Fresnel lens in the single dormer window. It was destroyed by a storm. Now
there is an unmanned, 27-foot reflective platform. This changing of hands makes me
wonder about the history of navigation in the birdfoot. At the Historic New Orleans
Collection in the French Quarter, I focused a magnifying glass on the three-branched
waterway on a map dating from 1794, by a cartographer named John Ross (during
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the Spanish rule of New Orleans).2 At the birdfoot, there were two small inkblots,
"Tree 1" and "Tree 2." The surrounding deltaic region and web of sedimentary
banks is labeled as "low and marshy meadows" with "shallow water covered with
small islands, which are but very little known" (HNOC). The significance of the
birdfoot in the late 1700s and 1800s – this unusually geometric waterway – was
that it was a recognizable entrance to the Mississippi amid a vast plain of changing
waterways and landforms. This must have been extremely confusing to an 18thcentury trade ship headed for the port at New Orleans. Even when you reach it, Ross
places two lone trees for you to triangulate your position and make sure you've
reached the actual birdfoot. But gradually, as the network of sedimentary islands
around it subsided and dissipated into the Gulf, even the need for a lighthouse
dwindled. It is the Mississippi's last alluvial arm reaching out into open ocean. This
simple fact obscures what seems, to me, an extraordinary sadness.
I'll allow myself a brief lapse into environmental romanticism: once upon a
time, the entrance to the Mississippi River was labyrinthine, a guessing-game in a
plain of "the youngest land in the world," the Land-Building Machine at all engines
go, a sand motor at full throttle (Jacobs). It was marked by two trees in an expanse
of muddy jetties, and a small, intermittently manned lighthouse. Now, the entrance
to the Mississippi is singular. The plain is gone, and the river's path circa 1930
extends out into the Gulf, preserved in perpetuity. But even it is eroding – and
quickly. In "Bayou Farewell" by Mike Tidwell, the author is on a shrimping trawl
near Grand Isle, LA, watching the GPS, when suddenly he notices they are about to
Course of the River Mississippi from the Balise to Fort Chartes (1794). By John Ross,
pub. Laurie & Whittle (1982). Property of the Historic New Orleans Collection.
2
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collide with a sand jetty at full speed. He tries to catch the attention of the man
driving the boat, Knuckles, but can't – and then they motor on through the landform.
Knuckles says, "I bought dat computer map in 1993 [...] we used to haf to zig and zag
t'rough canals and bayous here, now it's a straight shot. [...] De whole time, de GPS
says we're going t'rough land" (Tidwell 179). In seven years (seven life cycles of
brown shrimp, Tidwell notes), the obstacles are all gone. The mud lumps of Reclus
and Hall eroded to the sparse jetties navigated by Knuckles, to the open water
experienced by Tidwell. Today, if you enter the birdfoot delta from the Pass à
L'Outre (from the west), you see massive turbidity curtains before any sign of land.
South of the birdfoot, pluming out all along the coast of Louisiana, there is
now a famously large dead zone in the Gulf of Mexico. This hypoxic region is
inhospitable to most marine life, and measures between 7,286 and 8,561 square
miles in area – the size of a squashed New Jersey. It is caused largely by the chemical
runoff from the "American Ruhr," the snake of petrochemical development along the
Mississippi, who are notorious for their spillage incidents – but also by fertilizer
runoff from farms.
These stories litter Louisiana newspapers only a little less than they pollute
the river itself. In January, the massive Evangeline Pipeline finally burst in Cameron
Parish. It had been leaking since October, but not repaired. In February, an oil barge
spilled 31,500 gallons of light crude oil into the river after crashing into a towboat
between NOLA and Baton Rouge (Merchant). In early March, BP claimed to have
reached the "baseline condition" of cleanup after the 2010 Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill, an explosion that pumped 210 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico,
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largely accepted as one of the largest environmental disasters in American history
(Marshall). The day after this statement was released, the U.S. Coast Guard released
a statement that it was supervising the ongoing removal of a 25,000 pound oil tar
mat from East Grand Terre Island, off Louisiana's southeast coast. Two adult
bottlenose dolphins washed up dead the following day. Meanwhile, at a munitions
camp in Minden, LA, a private contractor named Explo Systems abandoned a
demolition site containing over 18 million tons of M6 propellant sold to them by the
U.S. Army in 2012 (Robertson). Since then, they have exploded small portions of this
stock irregularly, in the middle of the night. A committee of local ranchers and
environmental activists has only recently rallied up with the EPA to address
pollution concerns. In 2010, the USGS measured that 12.7 million pounds of toxic
chemicals were dumped into the river (Callais). In 2012, they released another
report that 57% of agricultural streams and 83% of urban streams were unsuitable
for aquatic health (Mueller).
This horrifying laundry list of transgressions, both recognized and
committed covertly on a daily basis, warrants a whole project of its own. Algae
blooms caused by all these excess nitrates released into the river are only one facet
of the environmental disaster flowing out of the birdfoot, and washing back on its
shores. Pollution, quite literally, circulates in every direction. Before I began this
project, the kind of dire attitudes I encountered in articles about land loss and
pollution seemed to be overly dramatic – now they seem like understatement.
In a series of articles titled "Losing Ground" by ProPublica and the Lens,
there is an interactive map online where readers can toggle between the birdfoot at

70
Venice from the 1930 to 2014. Between 1932 and 1956, a little corrosion occurs –
blue creeping slowly into the green that is assumed to be wetlands. In the mid-70s,
the blue multiplies exponentially. A thin webwork of land spreads out over placenames that have disappeared with their corresponding land masses: Pass de Wharf,
Bayou Tony, Yellow Cotton Bay, Wagon Wheel (this last one no doubt after early
logging patterns). Toggling out, this process replicates all along the coast – in
devastatingly clear graphics, you can trace the disappearing green as it is slowly
eaten at by the blue. The border between the two is made out to be a much clearer
line than it is in actuality.
On the ground, the difference is much less clear. As Adam Mandelman argues
in "Wetlands as Borderlands," one of the reasons land loss is such a difficult issue to
measure is that it always occurs as a "gradient between dry land and open water"
that is often not entirely clear, existing as both "boundary and intersection"
(Mandelman). In digital mapping terms, these areas are dealt with by using rasters –
contiguous data sets that shift gradually over a dynamic field. They may be
temporal, existing for only a season or depending on an unreliable water source. As
Mandelman would have it, their identity as such an uncertain borderland, or liminal
or hybrid space, shrouds them in a kind of doubt.
Rasters and borderlands suggest a kind of geographic liminality – a wet
surface that hides shifting, underwater values ranging in sediment, water, pollutants
and dry soil. It is a geologic hybrid difficult to express in aerial maps, even with their
extraordinary ability to scale in and out with LandSat imagery. These wetlands
depend on the oblique view, a wandering through the swamp, a gritty materiality to
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be felt in the hand and tasted in the mouth, full of sense-perceptions inexpressible
by digital mapping. They depend on a quality of light to determine their turbidity,
the amount of particulate matter, only really perceptible by a blinking, oblique gaze
as you wander through the shallow water, your boots stuck in the mud, sweat
beading along the brim of your baseball cap. This, to me, is how land loss feels. Or, as
Tidwell describes – a shrimper in Terrebonne Parish notices one day that his family
cemetery has been almost completely inundated with water. All cemeteries are
above grade in southern Louisiana, so that bodies don't rot in the water table or in
the event of a flood – wherever you go, there are roadside grids of white stone
mausoleums.
In order to be convincingly displayed in USGS graphics, land loss has to be
displayed in binary terms: land versus water, illustrated by false-color maps in only
blue and green. Blue corrosion has become symptomatic of nearly all land loss
maps. Or, more dramatically, the Louisiana raster is cast in monochrome black and
white, with the eroded wetlands coded in red. Both gradients train the eye to notice
negative space rather than positive – if you look closely, on the western coast of
Louisiana the Atchafalaya River and Wax Lake Outlet continue to build new land,
with new rivulets and streams slowly emerging from the river mouth. Brett
Anderson, in a cartographic study for Medium, uses a devastating visual argument –
Louisiana has nearly lost its characteristic boot shape, as its outline swiftly hems in
from the south. The political boundary, if it were shifted to an accurate depiction of
current dry land, would more resemble a column, eaten away at the base.
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In other places, land loss is much clearer: Isle de Jean-Charles became a
poster child for coastal erosion upon the release of the blockbuster hit "Beasts of the
Southern Wild" (2012), which renamed it the "Bathtub" and featured many
dramatic shots of its only access highway, stretching exposed through an expanse of
open water with its one line of telephone poles. The road has two lanes, and one has
almost entirely eroded into the Gulf – waves steadily lap across its pavement as
another storm buffers in. This place has even less security than Venice: no levees, no
governmental funding, only the prospect of heightening the pilings beneath your
home or moving away if you can't afford it. A nine-year-old actress named
Quvenzhané Wallis narrates: "Daddy says, up above the levee, on the dry side,
they're afraid of the water like a bunch of babies. They think we're all gonna drown
down here. The ground is gonna sink and the water is gonna rise up so high, and
everything south of the levee is going under." In the film, the Bathtub's community
rallies up and builds shelters on boats, hatching plans to dynamite the levee.
A more recent documentary, "Can't Stop the Water" (2014) shows the actual
Army Corps plans that have resulted in the fictional Bathtub's sinking. In 1998, the
USACE drafted a new levee guide plan that included Isle de Jean-Charles and its
causeway. Swiftly afterward, the plan was revised to leave the island out. Since then,
the width of the island has eroded from about five miles to a fourth of a mile, about
2,000 square miles of dry land gone. Chief Albert, a member of the Biloxi-ChoctawChitimacha community that has been on the island since the 1840s, drives his boat
around the island's perimeter and points out to the camera a series of recently built
oil rigs and the canals dredged for their pipelines, remarking that the island's
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inhabitant have gotten monthly royalties after their construction – about thirty
dollars each. All of these compound effects, against an ocean rising from climate
change and subject to more frequent and violent storms, gives the residents a tone
of sad acceptance in their speech. What if the levees were built now? So much has
been lost already, so many people gone.
Even the methods of coastal restoration worked on by the USACE are under
intense scrutiny. Here is where the scaling out occurs. By dint of the Coastal
Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act (CWPPRA) enacted in 1990,
there is now a Federal Task League working on about 110 coastal restoration
projects including marsh creation, sediment diversions, the construction of oyster
barrier reefs and levee reconstructions. This act was vetoed by George Bush, but
was repassed by the 110th Congress in 2007 with a budget of $1.6 billion, each of
fifteen target projects costing up to $280 million (Marshall). All are technically
slated for completion in 2032, but with an increasingly dwindling budget, many
have been stalled in the meanwhile.
The redrawing of the levee around L'Isle de Jean-Charles is just one example
of this effect, which has had consequences for the landscape all across the coast,
from Louisiana into Texas. Eleven of the federally-funded projects have been reestimated at about 500 million over budget each. Much of this project's stimulus
package came out of BP following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. John Barry, the
author of "Rising Tide: The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927" recently helmed
another lawsuit against 93 oil and gas companies (including Exxon, BP, Mobil and
Chevron), suing them for wetland damaging caused by the construction of wells and

74
dredging of canals. The New York Times Magazine ran a cover story on it in October
2014 with the words "Every hour, an acre of Louisiana sinks into the sea. Who is to
blame?" placed over an image of a canal bisecting the remnants of a swamp in
Plaquemines (Rich).
In February 2015, board members appointed by Governor Bobby Jindal shot
down the lasuit with the help of Judge Nannette Jolivette. The defense stated that
the plaintiff's charges of nuisance, negligence and drain (among others)3did not
represent violations of the Clean Water Act, the Rivers and Harbors Act or the
Coastal Zone Management Act because these were not designed to defend coastal
communities against erosion, storm surge, or "indirect economic losses" (Brown
10). Namely, that the Levee Authority didn't have the data to prove a direct
connection between the oil companies' activities and land loss (despite the USGS'
many studies) – and even if they did, their complaint cited unrelated environmental
protection acts. The Deepwater Horizon fell in direct penalty for the oil spill for
pollution rather than erosion as a result of something done in the past (dredging) –
this is what they mean by a failure to establish an "indirect" connection. The
CWPPRA website paints a positive picture of restoration, but on the ground, most
investigative journalism describes the efforts as paltry, poorly funded and badly
researched.
The construction of barrier islands is near unanimously accepted as a
beneficial force – it both keeps sediment in the marshes and protects the coast from
Other than the construction of oil and gas wells, for: "road dumps, ring levees,
drilling activities, fluid withdrawal, seismic surveys, marsh buggies, spoil disposal /
dispersal, watercraft navigation, impoundments, and propwashing / maintenance
dredging" (Brown 3).
3
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storm surge (and therefore, erosion). River diversions, however, have proved to be
hotly contentious for a wide range of reasons. Environmental advocates who
fiercely support coastal restoration have turned against diversions, claiming that
although they provide the wetlands much-needed sediment blocked by the levee
system, they will simultaneously introduce the Mississippi's pollutants. This has
potentially devastating effects for the bayou's biodiversity, especially for declining
crawfish and brown shrimp populations. If the Bonnet Carré Spillway goes under
great ecological scrutiny for its infrequent injections of freshwater into Lake
Pontchartrain every ten years or so, diversions make the same impact – except daily.
They push back salinity regimes, potentially displacing historic fishing grounds,
which means bad business for small-scale fishermen up against larger companies
for a living.
Some geologists, including Chris McLindon (of Stone Energy Corporation, an
offshore drilling investor) have argued that diversion projects have done more harm
than good. McLindon says that these freshwater introductions, laden with
agricultural nitrates and pollution, weaken the roots of coastal marsh grasses by
overexposing them to nutrients, quickening the erosive process when hurricanes
pass through – namely in the Caernarvon diversion in Plaquemines Parish, not far
from Venice (Alexander-Bloch 1). He argues instead for the prevalent use of pipeline
dredging. Here, imagine dredge boats siphoning settled material from the bottom of
a bay and pumping it through an articulated pipeline that sits precariously on
concrete blocks in open water. On the other end of the bay, it spews this sediment
onto a jetty. Hour by hour, a barrier island slowly rises from the ocean. This is one of
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many techniques currently used by the Army Corps. McLindon's opinions have been
swiftly denied by other scientists, who argue that diverting the Mississippi's
sedimentary loads is the only way to majorly impact wetlands increasingly lost to
the Gulf, and that the nitrate levels are safe. As fast as we can build islands around
the wetlands for protection, the wetlands themselves disappear. The conversation is
ongoing, but land loss continues worsening, especially in the late summer when
hurricane season comes around.
The Caernarvon diversion is one of many that have been in place for decades.
It was constructed in 1991, but is inconspicuous – simply a concrete culvert under
23-S (the road to Venice) which connects the main stream of the Mississippi to the
surrounding wetlands of Plaquemines Parish, less than half a mile away. There is a
much more conspicuous diversion in western Louisiana that receives much less
attention. It was built in 1941, is almost fourteen miles long, and is called the Wax
Lake Outlet, connecting the Atchafalaya River directly to the Gulf of Mexico.
Primarily designed to alleviate flooding in Morgan City, LA (which has become even
more important with the building of the Morganza Floodway), it has had enormous
unintended consequences. This is because, through the Atchafalaya, it is receiving
an inordinate amount of sediment. And like the Atchafalaya, a deltaic plain has been
forming at its mouth for about fifty years.
Its presence is striking when you know it's there, but easy to pass over in
maps pinpointing land loss – way over there, on the western end of the state, two
separate LBM's (Land Building Machines) have been churning away, accumulating
sediment and wetlands in a veined lobe protruding from the coast. The Atchafalaya
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and its unlikely sister channel, made by the same dredging process that drained the
backswamps of New Orleans.
Geographer and urban historian at Tulane University Richard Campanella
(who spoke earlier about Sauvé's Crevasse) has become somewhat of a well-known
public figure in New Orleans over the past decade. His books on Lincoln's steamboat
journey down the Mississippi and early colonial tales of New Orleans' settlement (in
addition to his monthly writings in the Times-Picayune) have made him something
of a recognizable city pundit. In January, he invited me to attend the opening
meetings of a geography seminar at Tulane's architecture school, and I interviewed
him the following day. He has a positive opinion of diversions, but most recently has
been publishing and advocating the idea of utilizing dredge material from the
deepening of the Mississippi in wetland renewal. In "Beneficial Use: Balancing
America's (Sediment) Budget," he presents this fairly simple proposal. With the
widening of the Panama Canal and the necessity to dig the Mississippi channel
deeper for so-called Panamax container ships, why not steer that sediment toward
diversions and siphons rather than tossing it in the water column to be washed
away by the Gulf.
A landscape architect named Bradley Cantrell has also recently put forward
designs with the landscape architecture program at LSU. With his class, he designed
several models of "cyborg" technologies that distribute upstream sediment down
through the delta – specifically, the Atchafalaya, one of the most productive areas of
the coast. One proposal is called "PodMod." In mesh tubes attached to river control
structures, sediment accumulates rather than hitting the weir and accumulating
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(later to be routinely dredged out by the USACE). Instead, these tubes would fill
smart, balloon-like "pods" with the substance, programmed to release when full,
float down the river and trigger a "process of electrochemical corrosion" when it
reaches a target area (Strickland). Then, each pod deposits its separate sedimentary
load so that a "choreography" of sediment could be programmed into the full
system, reflecting the changing needs of the delta, able to respond to real-time data
on land change. This represents what Cantrall terms a "tunable infrastructure" – a
technology with the adaptability of the ecosystem itself, a kind of decidedly less
anthropocentric river control. It's also a comically grandiose idea considering the
way the Army Corps currently spends money, with barely enough to properly
maintain its perimeter levees.
Campanella and Cantrell's ideas represent two very different thought
experiments about how river control should be modified – one intensely practical,
with an eye always on the budget, and one an architectural imaginary that pokes at
what it perceives as the realer, larger problem behind land loss. That problem is the
arrogance of engineering nature, an attempt to reign supreme over the landscape at
any cost. Here I remember the dictum inscribed on the U of Wyoming's engineering
building: "STRIVE ON, THE CONTROL OF NATURE IS WON, NOT GIVEN," or chalked
into the slate of ORCS: "Do What's Right, and Be Prepared to Fight as Infantry When
Required!!!" (McPhee 13, 21). This militaristic language permeates all of the
USACE's projects, understandably – they are a military engineering branch of the
federal government. Cantralls' unrealizable technologies are, in a way, impossible
attempts to win back the delta's favor, working in tandem with the stream to imitate
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its earlier land-building process. They reject a military engagement with the deltaic
ecology, staging accomodation rather than strict control at all costs. Campanella
might critique this as mere environmental romanticism, attempting to turn back the
geological clock to a time before the first human footprint in Louisiana mud, or the
first concrete berm laid across the water.

Conclusion: Scaling Down
There is only one thing that I left Louisiana certain of in February: attempting
to reverse river control is an exercise in futility, and there is no environmentally
sound solution. These levees, revetments and cutoffs, spillways and diversions, are
largely necessary to keep the urban populations of Southern Louisiana from
Katrina-level flooding. But even the Army Corps' revised perimeter system
surrounding New Orleans can't withstand a Category 3 storm in models released by
the National Hurricane System in the past few weeks (Marshall). This is largely
because the wetlands that previously acted as buffers to storm surge are now
underwater, gradually eroded away by canal dredging and the lack of a consistent
sediment supply. It's as if the Mississippi's engineering and the surrounding bayou
ecosystem have entered a negative feedback cycle, damaging and outmoding each
other until the fuse burns out in the delta, and life without the presence of high
water is no longer possible.
This project has covered early stages of that cycle: first, the construction of a
comprehensive levee system to forever prevent flooding (and replenishment of the
surrounding wetlands with nutrients and sediment) and the draining of the
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backswamp to build New Orleans and the plantations snaking along the river
northward. Second, the realization that a levees-only system was unsustainable –
worsening the flood cycle, most evident in the great flood of 1927. This disaster
enabled the formation of the Mississippi River Commission and its new vision of
Project Flood, a network of interconneced structures (floodways, diversions, weirs
and dams) that would forever protect the major cities of southern Louisiana. Chief
among them was Old River Control, a sill with the sole purpose of keeping the
Mississippi River from redirecting down the Atchafalaya, preserving its current
course in perpetuity.
All these stages of controlling the river share that common ambition: to
function as a kind of time machine, to break the clock of Louisiana's ecology in the
mid-1900s. Or, in the USACE's military terminology, to win the war against the river,
subdue and domesticate it into a well-behaved channel whose high spring waters
are predictable and able to be accomodated. The implicit missions: to keep New
Orleans a major port city and fuel its economy. To keep afloat the oil and gas
industries which employ such a large population of the southern parishes, but
funnel their money to offices in the north, out of state and local hands. The
compound effects of these landscape technologies – large-scale urban and rural
subsidence, the flooding of ancestral lands and displacement of graves and fishing
grounds, among others – are not their responsibility.
It is altogether too easy to demonize the Army Corps for their many failures:
the failure to properly maintain the walls of New Orleans' outfall canals before
Katrina hit, though they had been inspected and known to be in poor condition, the
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failure to include coastal communities like l'Isle de Jean-Charles within their
updated levee system. Many of these failures are markers merely of an extremely
small budget which is still shrinking. As Campanella put it to me, even a modest
settlement from the oil companies up against John Barry would only "pay for the
paperclips" in a series of coastal restoration projects costing several billion dollars
over a century. Even then, the coast will never be the same as it was in the time of
Basil Hall, Elisée Reclus, Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville, or any witnesses of the Big
Muddy when its nickname actually applied. It will be protected by humanconstructed barrier islands harboring a network of intricately planned wetlands
supplied sediment by artificial river diversions. The ecological consequences of such
a profoundly new coastal landscape is still an imaginary – it sometimes seems like
an attempt to make an enormous diorama of precolonial Louisiana, for which there
is neither funding or time. I am still not sure what other options exist.
It is especially imaginary within the city limits of New Orleans, a walled city
that forgets its walls are there. However, this year – 2015 – is one of several reality
checks. It marks the ten-year anniversary of Hurricane Katrina (August 23rd) and
the five-year anniversary of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill (April 20th). Beyond the
horrendous social and ecological havoc wreaked in the aftermath of both, they were
events that also rolled back the curtain on many much slower, ongoing disasters.
Flooding that occurred during Katrina, spread out unequally across the city,
demonstrated to a tee the kind of environmental racism built into the city's plan
since its foundation. It showed that lower-income, majority black populations live in
topographically lower areas of the city, worst affected by both flooding and the
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damages done by insurance companies on their return, while the higher-income
"white teapot" (so called for its shape across the cityscape) live along the natural
levee, and were largely unaffected by floods. The Deepwater Horizon spill shed a
light on the kind of pollution that petrochemical industries along the Gulf had gotten
away with for decades (still do) and focused the nation's eye on the growing dead
zone below the birdfoot delta. Images of oil-coated pelicans and dolphins washed up
dead on beaches, along with aerials of the Lower Ninth Ward underwater – these
are now part of the national American narrative of disaster, a train of events in
Louisiana dating back to the 1927 flood. They are not isolated incidents. They are
peaks in a sequence of interconnected calamities, which have eaten away at the
landscape and alienated its inhabitants. Oddly enough, both of them hold some
allegiance to the few successes and more frequent failures of the river control
system.
Out in the bay, two dredge boats look like yellow houses built on a watery
plain. From the bottom of the bay they suction sediment, pump it through a thin,
articulated pipeline across the water and spew it onto a series of jetties constructed
over a grid. This is how land is built now, more or less. You don't have the right to
live wherever you want and expect your telephone poles not to erode into the Gulf.
In small towns, the streets buckle and split along the canal walls. A snag boat tears
rebar from the broken concrete. One day you're on a speedboat with a man in a
Saints jersey and an eyepatch. With wide gestures, he points at the portions of open,
green-blue water which used to be islands he played on as a kid. The heat beats
down, but you've grown used to it, just like you've grown used to the water and the
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mosquitoes. I think the thing to fear isn't Louisiana underwater, but something to do
with vanity, engineering, and the determination to develop no matter what the
obstacles.
There are several small-scale projects that have popped up inside the city
limits of New Orleans that bring some hope to the larger coastal water issues. Dutch
Dialogues, a series of conversations with Dutch landscape architects, has turned into
the Greater New Orleans Water Plan in the past few years, spearheaded by David
Waggonner of Waggonner and Ball Architects. This plan includes a comprehensive
revision of New Orleans' drainage system including streetside bioswales, water
retention basins in empty lots and below-grade trenches to circulate rainwater to
major pumping stations along the city perimeter. It also has plans to revitalize major
outfall canals as blueways that basically serve as public parks, part of its idea to
create a city-wide network of bicycle, running and walking thruways (reducing the
number of NOLA residents using personal cars to commute). Due to lack of funding,
the plan has turned into an educational phase with Waggonner and Ball partners
getting piecemeal funding for each project – the first of these projects to get
sponsorship, the Lafitte Greenway, opens this summer.
Behind all these plans, David Waggonner articulates a larger issue: the failure
to use waterways in the urban scape of New Orleans creates a kind of city-wide
psychology that water belongs definitively outside the levee. Why not instead
circulate it throughout streets and canals, thereby both reducing nuisance flooding
and the stigma it brings? This seems to be the plan's central tenet: taking a term
from Timothy Pachirat, to create a new "politics of sight" for New Orleans in which
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water plays an active role. Establishing water as a part of a citizen's everyday
routine is more convenient system than relegating it to badly maintained canals
which inevitably overflow. It's also an implicit, infrastructural reminder of the larger
context of the city – a place which, in the next century, will have to make some
serious concessions to deal with land loss. Without the sediment trapped in
spillways and dams to the north, with all the dredged canals, it is quickly returning
to its watery origins.
What these micro-plans (in New Orleans) and macro-plans (along the
Louisiana coast) share in common is a vision of a hybridized relationship between
human life and the delta. Perhaps idealistic, and definitely lacking the financial
support they need to be realized, they propose that river control (and infrastructure
in general) should actually start resembling the ecology it reconfigures. This is a
form of accomodation much larger than Bonnet Carré, Morganza or Wax Lake,
which function as spigots in which the river's "fury" can be let out by federal
mandate. It requires that river control actually replicate controlled floods on a much
larger scale, keep its floodwaters inside city boundaries rather than pumping it out,
and distribute sediment with data-conscious "pods" like Cantrell's – this is a cyborg
dreamland. People are struggling to keep the pilings supporting their homes from
rotting.
Leaving New Orleans is always an unhappy event. Taking the on-ramp to I10, cruising past the Superdome and the Bonnet Carré Spillway on Lake
Pontchartrain, over all the protective layers the city has congealed, and out into the
expanse of watery terrain and cypresses, it is startling how stranded the city is. Way

85
out here, in the middle of a deltaic plain that is disintegrating away. This transition
startling even the fourth or fifth time driving away from the city. After that, it's
depressing.
Like in the Eames film "Powers of Ten," my mind's eye always telescopes
upward over the state from my own moving car. From above, so much is clearer
given a little history: the long-lot agricultural plots dating back to antecedent
cadaster planning for sugar plantations, trailing along the river like a spine, and the
surrounding bayous with their knotted strings of Cajun towns. To the west, the
Atchafalaya Basin laid out wide and green with the Morganza Floodway and Old
River Control at its peak – such comparatively small and simple structures to
generate such an epic landscape over half a century. Then there is the river itself,
which is always slightly out of reach, like a drainage channel in the city – its
container ships and fish kills and oil-slicked surface, its cottonwoods, giant reeds
and shores that are muddy where they haven't been overlaid with concrete
mattresses. I would like not to be romantic or to yearn for a deltaic system that's
unattainable. I would like to live in this place for as long as it's here. This is a way of
starting.
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Appendix: Additional Photos, January 2015.

1. Bridge at Crescent Park (2013), Bywater neighborhood.

2. Water's edge at Crescent Park.

87

3. Bayou St. John, the original portage of Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville, 1699.

4. Scant reeds at Bayou St. John today.
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5. Shell oil refinery in Norco, LA.

6. Bonnet Carré Spillway (1930). Norco, LA.
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7. Kenta Canal in Barataria Preserve, probably a logging canal from the early 1900s.

8. Oil remnants in the wetlands at Barataria Preserve.

90

9. Post-Katrina lakeshore pumping station at 17th Ave. Canal, New Orleans.

10. Stone levee at Bucktown Harbor on Lake Pontchartrain, New Orleans.
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11. Trash along the interior of a guide levee at Orleans Ave. Canal, New Orleans.

12. Construction of a new lakeshore pumping station at Orleans Ave. Canal, New Orleans.
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13. Near-empty drainage canal in Broadmoor neighborhood, New Orleans.

14. Model of canals and pumping stations in New Orleans at Waggonner & Ball Architects.
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15. Flood / rainwater drainage at Fort Jackson, Plaquemines Parish.

16. USACE pipeline dredging project at a harbor in Plaquemines Parish.
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